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The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany have
fundamentally changed the politics of security in Europe. This thesis analyzes German
perspectives on the international security environment and offers judgements about the
probable future role of nuclear deterrence in Europe.
The thesis begins with a survey of the role of nuclear deterrence in the security
policy of the Federal Republic of Germanv during the period prior to reunification in 1989-
1990. This is followed by an analysis of German views on the West European nuclear
powers: the United Kingdom and France. German views on the U.S. nuclear presence and
U.S. commitments to Europe are then examined. German views on nuclear weapons in
the former Soviet Union and the potential for proliferation on Europe's periphery complete
the survey.
For the short term, Germany will not change its present policies regarding nuclear
deterrence in Europe. The German nation is likely to remain preoccupied with the
reunification process for several years, and German politicians are not disposed to seek a
debate on nuclear deterrence. The Germans generally consider Britain and France
incapable of providing adequate nuclear protection for the Federal Republic in the near
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany have
fundamentally changed the politics of security in Europe. The future role of
nuclear deterrence is under scrutiny. In several countries, domestic pressures
encourage governments to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. This thesis
examines the prudence of such reductions and possible eliminations. It analyzes
German perspectives on the international security environment and offers
judgements about the probable future role of nuclear deterrence in Europe.
The thesis begins with a survey of the role of nuclear deterrence in the
security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany during the period prior to
reunification in 1989-1990. This is followed by an analysis of German views on the
West European nuclear powers: the United Kingdom and France. German views
on the U.S. nuclear presence and U.S. commitments to Europe are then examined.
German views on nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and the potential
for proliferation on Europe's periphery complete the survey.
For the short term, Germany will not change its present policies regarding
nuclear deterrence in Europe. The German nation is likely to remain preoccupied
with the reunification process for several years, and German politicians are not
disposed to seek a debate on nuclear deterrence. Germany is apprehensive about
IX
possible instability in the East, but is unwilling to jeopardize the smooth
withdrawal of Russian forces from eastern Germany with any new policy
ventures. The Germans generally consider Britain and France incapable of
providing adequate nuclear protection for the Federal Republic in the foreseeable
future, so the Germans will continue to relv on the United States for a credible
nuclear guarantee. In the longer term, the Europeans may achieve a level of unity
conducive to joint control over nuclear weapons; this might provide the Germans
with a viable European alternative. Germans are concerned about potential
developing threats from the south, including the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. It is unlikely that the Germans will pursue a national nuclear
deterrent barring the emergence of extreme circumstances— for example,
uncontrolled proliferation in and /or near Europe, antagonistic authoritarian
governments to the east, and an inadequate umbrella from either the U.S. or
Western Europe. It is in the interests of the United States to avert such a situation
by continuing to provide a credible nuclear guarantee to Germany.
I. INTRODUCTION
The profound changes now underway in Europe have been widely viewed
as harbingers of a new age of peace. With the Cold War over, it is said, the
threat of war that has hung over Europe for more than four decades is
lifting. Swords can now be beaten into ploughshares; harmony can reign
among the states and peoples of Europe. Central Europe, which long
groaned under the massive forces of the two military blocs, can convert its
military bases into industrial parks, playgrounds, and condominiums.
Scholars of security affairs can stop their dreary quarrels over military
doctrine and balance assessments, and turn their attention to finding ways
to prevent global warming and preserve the ozone layer. European leaders
can contemplate how to spend peace dividends. So goes the common
view. 1
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany have
fundamentally changed the politics of security in Europe. The future role of
nuclear deterrence is under scrutiny. In several countries, domestic pressures
encourage governments to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. This thesis
examines the prudence of such reductions and possible eliminations. It analyzes
German perspectives on the international security environment and offers
judgements about the probable future role of nuclear deterrence in Europe.
The thesis begins with a survey of the role of nuclear deterrence in the
security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany during the period prior to
!John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold
War," International Security Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990): 5.
reunification in 1989-1990. This is followed bv an analysis of German views on the
West European nuclear powers: the United Kingdom and France. German views
on the U.S. nuclear presence and U.S. commitments to Europe are then examined.
German views on nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and the potential
for proliferation on Europe's periphery complete the survey.
With respect to methodology, this study relies on a qualitative analysis of
German perspectives2 on the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe. A survey
of a limited number of primary sources in German, FBIS, The Week in Germany,
The German Tribune, and numerous other sources supports this examination. The
discussion confines itself to the German perspectives on each issue in an attempt
to reach informed judgements about the prospective course of German security
policy.
German security policy in 1992 has moved directly into the practical details
of the most far-reaching re-assessment and reorganization of the German armed
forces since their creation in the middle-1950s.3 Drastic cuts in forces, as well as
a general reorientation to new missions within an altered strategic setting have
generally overturned the comfortable assumptions of German defense planning.
2These German perspectives include the Chancellor's Office, the Ministry of
Defense, the Foreign Office, German defense experts, German foreign policy
experts, and German journalists.
interview with Professor Donald Abenheim, Stanford University, 23
November 1992.
This process will lead by the end of the century to a vastly different Bundeswehr
as regards missions, forces, and above all as regards the mentality of military
profession and the place of the soldier.
Put very simply, the Bundeswehr long existed as a kind of "deterrence army";
that is, a military whose simple existence fulfilled strategic objectives, but whose
ranks increasingly lacked the combat experience that is so central to the United
States armed forces. The strategic circumstances of the foundation of the
Bundeswehr in 1955-1965, as well as the basic tenet of its alliance integration
greatly circumscribe its missions and function. Although the principal mission
of the German armed forces remains that of "national defense," that is , the
protection of home territory against assault, the events of the past year lead one
to suggest that this customary task will increasingly be overshadowed by smaller-
scale rapid reaction missions.
The center-of-gravity of West German defense was long oriented toward the
life-or-death contingency of the central front. A chief means to master this
challenge lay in the adherence to the imperatives of alliance cohesion. Toward
this end, the West Germans created German combat power in concert with the
United States and the chief NATO allies. This development was part of a grand
Cold War bargain worked out in the 1950s that integrated German military power
in a non-threatening manner into the structures of the Western alliance; while at
the same time the Federal Republic of Germany sought to accept its fair share of
the burden of Western defense as a sign of its political reliability and military
skill. The success of German unification and the disentanglement of the military
confrontation in central Europe have brought in German eyes an enormous
increase in the sense of national security, although at the same time this
development has greatly undermined popular support for the requirement of
defense.
The flagging pace of unification in 1992 has placed an extraordinary burden
on the makers of German national policy. The difficulties visible, for instance, in
the crisis of the European Currency System and the outbreak of xenophobic and
racist violence throughout the FRG have moved German observers of national life
to speak of the gravest challenge to German democracy since 1949. The making
of defense policy cannot remain unaffected by such developments.
This phenomenon is especially evident in what could well be described as
the central issue of German defense in 1992: the creation of forces to perform
missions and functions removed from NATO. This process might have remained
in the realm of speculation for the next ten or more years had not the double-
shocks of the Gulf and Yugoslavia wars overwhelmed the makers of German
defense policy. German defense minister Volker Ruhe has moved forward
assertively to provide the means for a greater German role in international
organizations and crisis management; nonetheless, the historical and constitutional
limits, as well as obstacle of mentality in the civilian and military spheres, prevent
the German armed forces from plaving any significant role beyond a handful of
symbolic gestures at the moment.4
Within the larger context of fundamental change in German defense policy,
this thesis analyzes German perspectives on nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons
play a smaller role in alliance defense policy than during the Cold War.
Nonetheless, they are still vital to NATO deterrence policy, as stated in the new
strategic doctrine:
To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance
will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and
conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary,
although at a significantly reduced level. . . . The alliance's conventional
forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make
a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable
and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.5
Although not the central issue in German security policy today, the evolving
role of nuclear deterrence presents numerous challenges for European and
international security. Some of these challenges include: What role will be
assigned to nuclear deterrence in German security policy in the future? What are
the prospects for British-French nuclear cooperation leading to the development
4Abenheim, interview.
5The Alliance's Strategic Concept, (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Office of
Information and Press, November, 1991), p. 9, par. 39.
of a joint "European" deterrent, and would Germany rely on such a guarantee?
What is the future of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Germany? If there is a change
of government, will the German people demand the removal of all nuclear
weapons from German soil? Might the current government make such a
demand? If the U.S. nuclear guarantee was removed and there was no viable
European alternative, would the Germans pursue an autonomous national nuclear
deterrent? What are German perspectives about potential future threats from the
East and the role of nuclear deterrence in addressing such threats? What are
German perspectives about potential future threats from the South and the role
of nuclear deterrence in addressing such threats? Attempting to draw on a wide
range of German perspectives, the analysis that follows will attempt to reach
informed judgments about the challenges presented by the future role of nuclear
deterrence in European security.
This thesis is based on the assumption that, regardless of the changes in
Europe, "atomic weapons will remain an important element in world politics for
the foreseeable future."6 The prospects for worldwide nuclear disarmament are
remote. Responsible policy formulation must be conducted in an atmosphere of
"nuclear reality." Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented.
6Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Future of Nuclear Forces in European Security," at
Euro-American Workshop: What Future for Nuclear Forces In International
Security? (Paris: Institut Francais des Relations Internationales), 27 February 1992, 3.
Germany will play a decisive role in the future of nuclear deterrence in
Europe. Its geostrategic position and its strong economy have propelled Germany
to the leadership position in Central Europe. The ruling coalition has adhered to
NATO policy which has, since the October 1991 Nuclear Planning Group meeting,
relied on gravity bombs for U.S. and allied dual-capable aircraft in Europe, with
an implicit link to American strategic nuclear assets. The SPD opposition
proposes a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in Central Europe. In a recent
poll, "only forty-four percent of the Germans polled believed that nuclear
weapons had preserved peace in Europe while sixty-three percent stated that
nuclear weapons had endangered peace."7 These divergent German perspectives
provide part of the baseline for debates about nuclear weapons matters in the
Federal Republic.
Germany monitors potential French and British nuclear decisions with
interest. Both the United Kingdom and France have repeatedly reaffirmed their
positions as autonomous nuclear powers and are reluctant to emulate superpower
nuclear force reductions. The prospect of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation
leading to the development of a joint "European" deterrent appears doubtful in
the foreseeable future. Neither country seems likely to sacrifice its autonomy of
7Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and
International Reticence," statement before the House Sub-Committee on Europe
and the Middle East, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992, 5.
decision making, and the Germans are probably unwilling to rely on nuclear
guarantees from countries they appear to perceive as "lesser powers.'' The basis
for these judgments is discussed in Chapter III.
The Federal Republic has traditionally relied on the nuclear commitment of
the United States. The American troop levels in Europe have implicitly been
attached to the U.S. nuclear commitment and the current reductions in the U.S.
military presence may place this nuclear commitment in question, especially if
German public opinion and /or future governments will no longer accept any U.S.
nuclear presence— that is, not even air-delivered weapons. The Germans could
find themselves in a difficult position if the nuclear commitment from the United
States declined without a viable replacement.
Germany faces this dilemma while assorted risks and threats evolve in the
East and South. Uncertainty surrounds the future of the nuclear weapons in the
former republics of the Soviet Union, particularly Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan. How should Germany respond to nuclear proliferation in countries
in the Middle East and North Africa? These potential threats to Western Europe
are vital factors in the future strategic planning of the region.
The Federal Republic is faced with decisions of enduring importance and
extreme complexity as it formulates its policy on nuclear weapons. It must take
into account an unpredictable, dismantling "former superpower" with nuclear
8
weapons and an immense conventional force capability. Germany also must plan
for the probable emergence of new power centers that will almost certainly
become nuclear as technology proliferation continues.
These are difficult decisions for a nation that continues to renounce
autonomous nuclear weapons development. The debate is complicated further
as the interests and policies of Germany's European neighbors must be included
in any future nuclear security plans. Maintaining credible nuclear protection
would represent a great challenge for the Federal Republic if the Americans
turned inward and the French and British remained aloof.
II. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE SECURITY POLICY
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY PRIOR TO REUNIFICATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Nuclear deterrence has been the central pillar of alliance strategy since the
founding of the Federal Republic of Germany. Initially in a position of limited-
sovereignty, West Germany struggled to absorb the evolving alliance strategy.
As West German power increased, alliance security policy reflected greater
German influence. Throughout the period from 1949-1989, West Germany
influenced alliance security policy to meet German national interests. According
to Chancellor Kohl, this process laid the groundwork for the pinnacle of West
German foreign and security policy, Germany's unification.
It is clear to me today, that everything that happened in foreign and security
policy after 1983 and up until German unification began with the NATO-
Doppelbeschluss (Nato dual-track decision, the decision to station medium-
range missiles in the Federal Republic). We showed the Soviet Union . . .
that the West will not let itself be forced to its knees. My political fate was
bound up with that decision. If we had not participated, the confidence we
enjoyed among our allies with regard to German unity would have been
considerably diminished, not least with the Americans. 8
8Helmut Kohl, interview with Welt am Sonntag in The Week in Germany, 2
October 1992, 2.
10
The focus of this chapter is the role assigned to nuclear deterrence in West
German security policy prior to November 1989. The chapter surveys the major
points in the development of the Federal Republic's nuclear policy, including its
initially dependent status under Adenauer, its first formulation under Strauss, its
refinement under Schmidt, and its final assertion under Kohl.
The chapter considers the evolution of the nuclear issues in West German
security policy in four phases: (1) 1945-1960, (2) 1961-1969, (3) 1970-1979, (4) 1980-
1989. These periods were selected to divide the era into approximately equal
segments while containing related topics. In each phase the controversies, debates
and policy struggles of West German security policy will be analyzed as they
relate to nuclear deterrence. The chapter concludes with a summary of dominant
themes.
B. 1945-1960
1. Adenauer Laying the Foundation: 1945-1953
The role of nuclear deterrence in West German security policy was
heavily influenced by the Federal Republic's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer.
Adenauer was dependent on the counsel of his military advisors, General Speidel
and General Heusinger, because his knowledge of military affairs was limited.
Nonetheless, Adenauer had judgments about nuclear deterrence and U.S. nuclear
11
capabilities at a very early point. In Adenauer's Memoirs, these judgments are
described as affecting his approach to security policy as early as 1946.
Adenauer was critical of American policy towards Germany and the
Soviet Union immediately following World War II. According to Adenauer,
The policy of the Western Allies towards us showed all too clearly that they
had not recognized the Soviet aim. The United States of America had an
atomic monopoly and saw in this, rather short-sightedly, an absolute
guarantee of superiority to any danger that might threaten from the
direction of Soviet Russia.9
Adenauer was reluctant to place too much emphasis on the value of nuclear
deterrence.
This reluctance was reinforced with the first Soviet test explosion of an
atom bomb in 1949. Adenauer did not believe that the Americans would use
atomic weapons against the Soviet Union to protect the Federal Republic. "I
considered it extremely doubtful that in such a contingency, in which not the
Soviet Union but the Soviet zone government was the aggressor, the United States
would use atomic weapons against Russia." 10
The Korean War highlighted the limitations of nuclear deterrence from
Adenauer's perspective. "The United States had placed too much reliance on its
atomic weapons and measures of economic assistance. [The North Korean
9Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-53, trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company, 1966), 78.
]0
Ibid., pp. 273, 275, 281.
12
invasion of] South Korea demonstrated that these were not enough to halt
communism." 11 Adenauer's early judgements about nuclear deterrence and
American commitments provided the foundation of West Germany's future
security policy.
2. The Nonproduction Pledge: 1954
The Federal Republic's first formal action with respect to nuclear
weapons policy was Adenauer's 1954 nonproduction pledge. In the 1954 London
and Paris accords which provided for West Germany's accession to NATO, the
Germans pledged that:
The Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any
atomic weapons . . . defined as any weapon which contains . . . nuclear fuel
. . . and which, by . . . uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuclear
fuel ... is capable of mass destruction . . . [or] any part, device, assembly
or material especially designed for . . . any [such] weapon. 12
Much controversy has surrounded the pledge and the conditions under
which it was made. This section examines the political context of the pledge and
"Ibid., 319.
12Protocol III, on the Control of Armaments, Annex I (incorporating the
provisions of Annex II, paragraph 103), reprinted together with the other
protocols modifying the Brussels and North Atlantic treaties in Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the
Federal Republic of Germany and Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on Accession of
the Federal Republic of Germany, Executives L and M, 83rd Congress, 2nd sess.
(1954); quoted in Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear
Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 9.
13
its origins in the negotiations for the ill-fated European Defense Community
(EDO.
According to Catherine Kelleher, "The 1954 pledge can be viewed in
many respects as the last in a series of control measures set down by the wartime
Allies for a defeated and, subsequently, not-yet-sovereign Germany.
"
13 After
World War II, any connection between Germany and the production of
armaments, especially nuclear, was strictly controlled. From an American
perspective, the outbreak of the Korean War made the establishment of West
German armed forces an immediate requirement. The European Defense
Community was the initial attempt to meet the need for rearmament while
allaying international fears of a resurgent Germany.
The EDC was in essence a French attempt to institutionalize European
control over German rearmament. When the EDC was not ratified by the French
National Assembly, essential elements of the EDC's nuclear negotiations were
carried over into the 1954 pledge. Adenauer knew that the French would be
unwilling to accept German rearmament without some restrictions.
Adenauer established several conditions for his 1954 pledge. One of
these was equality; Adenauer was not willing to accept a Bundeswehr that was
inferior to its allies. He also demanded full sovereignty for the Federal Republic
13
Kelleher, Germany and Nuclear Weapons, 11,
14
and a security guarantee from the United States. Adenauer clearly stated that
his pledge had been given only rebus sic stantibus—"that is, only tor as long as
Bonn believed the conditions under which it was given still existed." 14
Some controversy remains over the Federal Republic's interest in
autonomous nuclear weapons production. The German organization established
to produce an atomic weapon during World War II was many years behind the
American project. After the war there was little or no interest in developing such
weapons in Germany. "So far as it existed at all, the problem of German
production of nuclear weapons existed almost solely in the perceptions, the fears,
and the plans of the wartime Allies." 15
3. The Transition: 1955-1956
The renunciation pledge helped to set the stage for the Federal
Republic's entrance into NATO in 1955. At that time there was a great reliance
on nuclear weapons within the alliance.
It was expected that war would begin with massive nuclear blows: the
ground forces would be the "shield" whose task was to fight a brief action
in Germany while the strategic air force, the "sword," would paralyze the
opponent. 16
14Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1953-1955 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags
Anstalt, 1966), 346-47; quoted in Kelleher, Germany and Nuclear Weapons, 10.
15
Kelleher, Germany and Nuclear Weapons, 28.
16James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1966), 40.
15
The first major combat exercise which tested this theory was Carte
Blanche, conducted June 20-28, 1955. Carte Blanche "produced widespread unrest
and agitation within the Federal Republic." 17 Much of this reaction stemmed
from reports in the weekly magazine Der Spiegel stressing the maneuver's
simulated results:
More than 300 atomic bombs dropped on more than 100 targets
between Hamburg and Munich, with 1.7 million Germans killed, 3.5
million wounded, and incalculable additional casualties resulting from
fallout. 18
The fear of nuclear destruction in Germany resulting from Carte Blanche lingered
as the Federal Republic met its next nuclear policy crisis in July 1956.
Known in the Federal Republic as the Radford Crisis, this controversy
stemmed from a New York Times story of 13 July 1956. The article outlined a
change in American strategic planning proposed by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford. Admiral Radford was calling for a
greater reliance on nuclear weapons and a reduction of conventional forces. 19
For the Germans this plan entailed a reduced U.S. conventional
presence in the Federal Republic offset by increased tactical nuclear weapons.
Chancellor Adenauer was reluctant to rely on nuclear deterrence and was in the
17






process of gathering political support for conventional rearmament. The
chancellor "voiced a muted criticism of American policy in a brief article on the
dangers of an overemphasis on nuclear weapons"20 :
Since, in my opinion, atomic weapons truly constitute the greatest danger
for all humanity, I therefore consider it right to push now for controlled
disarmament. All energy should be used to make nuclear war impossible.
In my view, it is particularly important to localize possible smaller conflicts.
And for that we need divisions with conventional weapons. Their number
must be sufficient to prevent a small spark from igniting a rocket war
between continents. In their planned numbers, the German divisions could
contribute much to this. ... As resolutely as I support all which can serve
controlled disarmament, I unequivocally declare my opposition to any
conversion [Umriistung] to atomic weapons. Too, if the West reduces its
ground forces, the land army of the Russian colossus will gain importance
with respect to Europe. 21
Carte Blanche had demonstrated the colossal devastation which a
nuclear engagement could inflict on the Germans. The Federal Republic was
reluctant to adopt this new American strategic doctrine. This strategy presented
the West German public and its political and military leadership with the reality
of their security dilemma: How to rely on a deterrent which, if it failed, would
result in Germany becoming a nuclear battleground and suffering certain
destruction?
20Richardson, 45.
2l Westdeutsche Rundschau, 27 July 1956; cited in Kelleher, Germany and Nuclear
Weapons, 47.
17
Nevertheless, the West Germans were obliged to accept the change in
strategic planning due to their reliance on U.S. and NATO support. The Federal
Republic decided to make the revisions in planning, but it was reluctant to
present them to a public made fearful by the Carte Blanche crisis and also afraid
of a U.S. withdrawal from Germany. Therefore the Adenauer regime used the
Radford crisis to make the United States the "whipping boy" for revisions which
were difficult politically.22
The Radford and Carte Blanche crises set the stage for hard German
political decisions with respect to nuclear weapons. The Germans eventually had
to play a greater role in the decision-making regarding nuclear weapons to
prevent a perception of separated roles within the alliance. Franz Josef Strauss,
serving as minister for atomic affairs, "hinted at the policy of atomic arms for the
Bundeswehr, asserting that a power without nuclear weapons would capitulate
before an ultimatum of an atomic power."23 Any decision to maintain a nuclear
capability, no matter how limited, was certain to fuel political opposition both
domestically and internationally. How could the Federal Republic balance its
security requirements with the divergent demands of its allies and its populace?
^Kelleher, Germany and Nuclear Weapons, 49.
^Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 September 1956; cited in Richardson, 44.
18
4. Gaining Access to Nuclear Weapons: 1957-1960
West Germany's decision to provide the Bundeswehr with delivery
vehicles capable of being fitted with nuclear weapons, which would be controlled
by the United States, was one of the most controversial in its history. It inflamed
a volatile populace, raised fears abroad, and brought the issue of control-sharing
to the forefront.
a. German Strategic Thinking and the Role of Franz Josef Strauss
The central strategic issues for the Federal Republic in this period
were:
The details and implications of the Germans' full participation in a system
based on (1) the early use of tactical nuclear weapons on their territory and
(2) on the sufficiency of American strategic nuclear forces to ensure
deterrence of enemy attack and guarantee of German security, at a time
when the advent of Soviet-American strategic parity was foreseen. 24
Franz Josef Strauss, the Minister of Defense from 1956 to 1962, played the
dominant role in determining the Federal Republic's response to this challenge.
Strauss guided German security policy with four main convictions:
regarding the past as a closed issue, complete adherence to the West, reunification
through strength, and equal status within the alliance framework. 20 He
considered nuclear weapons the "key to military and political power" and worked
24
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to ensure that in all areas within NATO, "the Federal Republic would be a
primary, equal participant.
"
26 Strauss maintained these convictions through two
major nuclear policy challenges of 1957: the Soviet launching of Sputnik, and the
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) study on future European
defense requirements in an era of approaching strategic nuclear parity.
The SHAPE study and the Sputnik launch intensified the German
debate on security policy. The German security discussion experienced a
transformation with the realization that the United States no longer enjoyed
"absolute" security, and was susceptible to Soviet nuclear attack. NATO's
deterrence system was based on the threat of strategic retaliation from the United
States. When the U.S. became more vulnerable, the question arose whether
Washington would be willing to sacrifice New York for Bonn, or Los Angeles for
Paris.
Public acceptance by Europeans of the concept of limited war fought in
Europe with nuclear or conventional forces that were somehow separated
from the strategic retaliatory power of the United States would not only
undermine the deterrence system, it would also admit the unconfrontable:






Strauss confronted these new circumstances with positions similar
to his American contemporaries. Much like Adenauer he was wary of placing too
much reliance on nuclear weapons.
It is even more necessary not to attempt war prevention through
dependence on the pure deterrent factor of ultimate great weapons but
rather to keep in view the possibility of meeting more limited conflicts with
more limited weapons, most especially situations in the non-European
sphere. 28
Nevertheless Strauss was a strong proponent of the concept of
"graduated deterrence." He saw deterrent value in tactical nuclear weapons, and
his interest in alliance equality ensured that Germany would have access to such
weapons.
If the attacker knows he faces a defense armed only with conventional
weapons, he can mass his troops for a breakthrough since he knows he has
no atomic strike to fear. The defense, on the other hand, must disperse its
force—in a form suitable for defense against conventional attacks—because
it cannot be at all sure that the attacker will not use tactical atomic weapons.
The conventional breakthrough of the atomically armed invader will thus
be favored. ... A temptation to aggression . . . thus will result.29
A final issue of West German strategic thought during this period
was forward defense. Meeting the enemy on the border was essential for the
strategically narrow Federal Republic. Loose talk of a defense on the Rhine met
28
Bulletin des Presse—und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 17 October 1957;
quoted in Kelleher, Germany and Nuclear Weapons, 80.
29Franz Josef Strauss, "Preis des Friedens," Wehrtechnische Monatshefte,
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heavy West German resistance. Strauss rejected operational guidelines that would
prevent or prejudice "the most resistance necessary as close to the border as
possible." 30
The German government finally accepted a system which required
a nuclear-capable Bundeswehr for several reasons. One point argued by both
Adenauer and Strauss was the force of technological development. As Adenauer
argued, "Today, atomic armament is in flood tide. The Germans must adapt
themselves to the new circumstances."31 Strauss echoed these views, predicting
that "atomic armament would come in all European armies . . . the Bundeswehr
must also adapt itself to this apocalyptic military future."32
The government also insisted on the continual theme of equality,
striving for a primary role within the alliance. NATO had decided there was a
requirement for nuclear weapons in Europe. Acquiring tactical nuclear weapons
was the only way to avoid a meaningless armament and the perception of the
™Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 10 May 1959; cited in Kelleher, Germany and Nuclear
Weapons, 85.
31Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 296; cited in Kelleher, Germany and Nuclear Weapons,
93.
^Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 February 1957; cited in Kelleher, Germany
and Nuclear Weapons, 93.
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Federal Republic as a "weak link."" As Adenauer declared in the final debate
in the Bundestag on this issue:
I want as many Germans as possible to hear this. If an important part of
NATO doesn't possess weapons as strong as those of its potential opponents
. . .
then it has neither significance nor importance. If the strategic planning
of NATO--and we must naturally and will naturally test this-desires that
we too, the Federal Republic, make use of this development, and if we
hesitate to do so, then we automatically leave NATO (and are left at the
mercy of the Soviet Union).34
b. Domestic and International Opposition
Domestic opposition to a nuclear-armed Bundeswehr was expressed
in the spring of 1957 when the Social Democratic Party (SPD) proposed halting
the spread of nuclear weapons. The SPD proposed to end nuclear arming of the
Bundeswehr and to refuse allied nuclear weapons stationing on German territory.
Concurrently, eighteen leading physicists presented the government with the
Gottingen Appeal of April 1957:
Today a small country like the Federal Republic will best protect itself and
do the most to advance world peace by expressly and voluntarily rejecting
the possession of atomic weapons of any kind.35
The SPD's opposition to the nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr
was a logical progression from its general stand against armament in general.
J3
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The SPD continually criticized Adenauer for his attachment to the West. In the
opinion of the SPD, reunification could best be achieved through a position of
neutrality. Adenauer's plan to negotiate reunification through a position of
strength, which meant an attachment to NATO, would--the SPD argued-only
hurt chances for a united Germany. The SPD believed that "unilateral
renunciation of nuclear weapons or perhaps creation of a Central European
nuclear-free zone to be a necessary and acceptable precondition for any serious
future negotiations toward reunification."36
The SPD attempted to use the nuclear armament issue to its
political advantage. The bitter flavor of the parliamentary debates in the spring
of 1958 was an indication of SPD attempts to discredit the Adenauer regime for
political gain.
Speakers for the SPD . . . described the government's policy variously as an
indulgence of Strauss' [s] desire to play at soldiers, an indication of the
Chancellor's subservience to John Foster Dulles, and a sign that the military
caste was reasserting its dominance in German life. Speakers for the
government tended to . . . regard oppositionists as pro-Communists and
neutralists.37
36
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When its efforts in the Bundestag failed, the SPD took the issue to
the streets in the form of the "Kampf dem Atomtod" (Campaign against Atomic
Death). This five month movement consisted of "innumerable emotional
speeches, rallies, protest demonstrations, attempts to institute popular referenda
that were expressly prohibited by the Basic Law, and mountains of antiatomic
propaganda."38
There was widespread public opposition to nuclear armament of
the Bundeswehr and against atomic weapons being stationed in West Germany-
Numerous polls showed from sixty to eighty percent of the public opposing
nuclear weapons in Germany. 39 Nonetheless, the SPD was unable to transform
this opposition into electoral victories, and therefore was unable to stop the tide
of nuclear armament.
External opposition to West Germany's search for equality in
nuclear-capable weapons came from the East and opposition politicians and
analysts in the West.40 Both sides had similar goals: a nuclear-free Central
Europe. Through disengagement and a reduction in military tension, the East
38
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promised reunification and the opposition in the West promised peace. The
Eastern position was dominated bv the Soviets and outlined in the Rapacki
proposals of 1957 and 1958. These proposals called for a nuclear-free zone
covering Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The West German government did not
trust the Soviets to deliver on their promise of reunification through
denuclearization. There was also concern about the effects of a denuclearized
Germany on the alliance.
Denuclearization would mean that Germany would have imposed upon it
permanently a different status from the other members of the alliance. As
the state most in need of protection, it would become, in a period when
American vulnerability was beginning to cast doubt on the credibility of an
American nuclear response, the state whose protection by the alliance was
most doubtful.41
Opposition to the presence of nuclear weapons in West Germany
was expressed by leaders of the British Labour Party (then in opposition, not in
government) and by intellectuals such as George Kennan. The Western advocates
of disengagement and denuclearization concentrated on what they considered the
"intolerable, inherently unstable status quo in Central Europe."42 Fears
resurfaced of a German national nuclear deterrent force, but all Western
41Richardson, 55.
42
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governments rejected the disengagement and denuclearization advocacy of certain
opposition parties and intellectuals.
The West German government refused to submit to what it termed
political discrimination. West Germany was unwilling to hold a separate position
within the alliance. A non-nuclear-capable Bundeswehr would serve the ultimate
design of the Soviet position-that is, separating West Germany from its alliance
partners.
c. Control-Sharing
The control-sharing issue gained importance in the alliance in the
late 1950s as U.S. nuclear weapons began to arrive on European soil. Control-
sharing is defined as "European participation in the stockpiling, targeting, and use
of nuclear warheads."43 While Britain and France were pursuing autonomous
national nuclear capabilities, the Federal Republic was desperately trying to carve
out a niche in NATO's new nuclear arena.
The Federal Republic was uniquely constrained in its nuclear
policy. The West Germans were trapped between a renunciation pledge and an
intense requirement for participation in all levels of decision-making as the front
line state. Germans could neither produce, or threaten to produce, a national




completely reliant on Washington's control-sharing policy, and as the most
exposed NATO state, deeply concerned with the outcome of the process. 44
Adenauer was interested in nuclear-control sharing that "guaranteed nuclear-
weapon release before the Federal Republic's territory had been overrun and,
more important, that would convince the Soviets of Western European if not
American determination to use nuclear weapons."45
The nuclear control-sharing issue inflamed differences within the
alliance. The British were against armament of the Bundeswehr with nuclear
weapons, or any mention of European nuclear cooperation. The British wanted
to maintain their unique relationship with the United States and were unwilling
to permit further nuclear sharing within the alliance. 46
The French were more interested in drawing German resources
away from the United States and in preparing for an eventual U.S. withdrawal
from the continent by increasing West European capabilities. The French were
willing to include German financial support in their weapons research and
development. Negotiations in this area evolved into the F-I-G: a consortium of
France, Italy and West Germany to produce modern weapons. When de Gaulle
^Kelleher, Germany and Nuclear Weapons, 123.
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returned to the French government in 1958, he ended the progress of the F-I-G
consortium. 47
The control-sharing debate was particularly inflammatory during
the late 1950s. The West Germans responded to Western anxieties with
accusations of political discrimination. Strauss demanded equality in the nuclear
realm, and at times explicitly threatened the consequences of inequality. "I can
guarantee that for three, four, or even five years there will be no German nuclear
weapons. After that, however, if other states, especially France, produce their
own atomic bombs, Germany could also be dragged in." 48
In the end, the West Germans chose to rely on control-sharing
through NATO. A multi-lateral umbrella was the safest political route for the
Federal Republic. NATO control-sharing allowed the Federal Republic to forgo
a decision between the United States and France, and pursue a equal position
within the alliance.
C. 1961-1969
The 1950s were a difficult decade for the West Germans as they were forced
to accept the reality of the vital role of nuclear weapons in the defense of the
"Ibid., 151.
48Interview in Daily Mirror, 2 April 1958, quoted in Hans Frederick, Franz Josef
Strauss: Das Lebensbild eines Politikers (Munich-Inning: Humboldt, n.d.), 190; cited
in Kelleher, Germany and Nuclear Weapons, 150.
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Federal Republic. The 1960s were equally turbulent because "flexible response"
challenged much of the nuclear deterrence theory that the West Germans had
accepted in the 1950s. The controversy over the multilateral nuclear force (MLF)
and the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) ignited fears of a German national nuclear
deterrent.
This section begins with a survey of the discord over strategy as West
Germany accepted flexible response. It continues the discussion on control-
sharing exhibited in the MLF debate, and concludes with a discussion of the NPT
and fears of a German national nuclear deterrent.
1. Discord over Strategy: 1961-1962
The American introduction of flexible response as a new NATO
strategy was received unfavorably in the Federal Republic. In the opinion of
many West Germans, Secretary of Defense McNamara's emphasis on conventional
defense in Europe jeopardized the American nuclear guarantee. Adenauer's
efforts at rapprochement with France made agreement to the new strategy
impossible, given French opposition to any moves away from massive retaliation.
Moreover, the SPD had supported the new American strategy, and West German
government officials apparently felt threatened by U.S. attempts to court the
opposition.
30
Minister of Defense Franz Josef Strauss was a primary opponent of
flexible response. In March 1961, Strauss contended that while
he understood the need for conventional arms strength, [any agreement] to
meet conventional attack, whether large or small, with conventional
weapons alone was the ideal invitation for an aggressor to attempt such an
attack, knowing that it would not be as dangerous. 49
Strauss also believed that public pronouncements about flexibility weakened
deterrence and exposed the Federal Republic to Soviet pressure.50 He valued
tactical nuclear weapons and their role in forward defense, and pushed for West
German equality within the alliance with respect to nuclear armament.
The Berlin crisis of 1961 illuminated the paradox in German nuclear
strategy. The Federal Republic was reluctant to accept the strategy of flexible
response because it questioned any movement away from the previous policy of
threatening an early use of nuclear weapons. Yet when the German Democratic
Republic built the Berlin wall in 1961, the FRG was as unwilling as other NATO
governments to consider the use of nuclear means to resolve the crisis.
In short, a strong emphasis on the early use of nuclear weapons was
regarded by the German leadership as essential to maintaining a credible
deterrent. But when confronted with an actual crisis, all other responses-
diplomatic, economic, even conventional—were clearly preferable.31
^Guardian, 17 March 1961; cited in Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible





The experience of confronting a crisis caused many West Germans to reassess
their attitude towards flexible response.
Reconciliation with the United States on this issue was still several
years away. In 1962, German-American discord peaked as the Americans
attempted to educate the allies on the new NATO strategy. McNamara presented
American perspectives in unprecedented detail during the North Atlantic Council
meeting at Athens.
For the Germans these sessions seemed to provide further evidence of the
Americans' determination to impose, not to discuss, changes in the common
strategy, changes that would benefit the United States. The decisions
already had been made and publicized; German counterarguments were
obstacles to be overcome, not legitimate points worthy of further
consideration.02
This dominant American position came to light again in the continuing
control-sharing debate. The Berlin crisis brought renewed emphasis on West
German demands for NATO control of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
Adenauer raised the issue of a short response time:
We must arrange within NATO so that a decision can be taken to use
atomic weapons before the President is heard from ... for it may be that an
immediate decision has to be taken when the fate of all could be decided in
one hour and the President . . . cannot be reached.53
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Strauss was more explicit with his remarks. In response to
McNamara's claims of American strategic superiority, Strauss questioned what
the future held when the Soviets obtained strategic parity. Strauss feared that a
Europe without an adequate deterrent would face nuclear blackmail; the Soviets
would offer the U.S. sanctuary for non-intervention. 54 Once again, fears of
Strauss's "nuclear obsession" were raised as he implicitly threatened an eventual
national nuclear deterrent if West German control-sharing requirements were not
met. 03
2. Strategic Reconciliation and the MLF: 1963-1966
A change in leadership in the Federal Republic helped to bring a more
conciliatory posture to allied relations. Adenauer's successor, Ludwig Erhard
(who took office in October 1963), and Strauss's successor, Kai-Uwe von Hassel
(who took office in October 1962), both emphasized closer relations with the
United States. This conciliatory policy led to NATO's acceptance of forward
defense and renewed efforts to establish mutually satisfactory nuclear control-
sharing arrangements.
West Germany's primary diplomatic accomplishment during this
period was the NATO agreement to Bonn's conception of forward defense. The




decision to plan for a defense of the Federal Republic at its border with East
Germany was a goal of the West Germans since entering the alliance. Defense
Minister von Hassel commented on the importance of forward defense from the
West German perspective:
This is a matter of life and death for my country. To regard the Federal
Republic, or even a larger part of Western Europe, solely as a battlefield,
which NATO forces would have to liberate afterward, would forecast the
total destruction of Western Europe.56
Differences remained on the interpretation of strategic doctrine.
Flexible response had become more acceptable to the Federal Republic, but
concerns remained as to the validity of the American guarantee. As Kai-Uwe von
Hassel argued,
The concept of flexible response in Europe—both political and military—must
not be interpreted to mean that the so-called atomic threshold can be raised
unduly high, without reference to political considerations. Apart from the
fact that this would lead the potential aggressor to think that he could
calculate his risk, it would create a situation in which he could seize pawns
for future negotiations.57
Another major topic of this period was the multilateral nuclear force
(MLF). The MLF was an American attempt to stem what was feared might
become a growing tide of nuclear proliferation in Europe while meeting the
control-sharing needs of its alliance partners. The proposal was "for a jointly
56Kai-Uwe von Hassel, "Organizing Western Defense," Foreign Affairs Vol. 43,




owned, financed and controlled multilateral force--a fleet of 25 mix-manned
surface ships each carrying eight Polaris missiles."58 The West German
government supported the program, concentrating on its political effects.
The Multilateral Force as a whole would constitute a substantial military
capacity. Its major importance, however, would be its political aspect. It
would provide an additional political link between the European and
American partners to the Alliance. Its close interlacing with the nuclear
potential of the United States would result in strengthening the deterrent on
the one hand, and establishing strong ties between Europe and America on
the other.59
There was opposition to the MLF concept within West Germany. The
opposition originated with a "Gaullist" faction which resisted the government's
Atlanticist emphasis. Former Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss summarized
this viewpoint when he declared,
We Europeans should not place blind confidence in the reliability and
trustworthiness of the Americans, who do not wish without more ado to let
themselves be drawn into an atomic war ... So long as Europe has no
nuclear weapons, Europe has no sovereignty. The only solution is to pool
British and French weapons-which should be fully supported by the full
transfer of American know-how. Thus in the long run a European atomic
force would come into existence under the precondition, of course, of
political union. 60
58Stromseth, 75.
59Kai-Uwe von Hassel, "Detente Through Firmness," Foreign Affairs Vol. 42, No.
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What eventually killed the MLF was opposition from the United
Kingdom and France. The British were reluctant to sacrifice their preferred
position within the alliance with respect to nuclear weapons. They were also
wary of West German aspirations for a national nuclear deterrent.
The French were reluctant to sacrifice autonomy in the area of nuclear
weapons; they did not trust the American nuclear guarantee. The French went
to great lengths to prevent the West Germans from gaining nuclear control
through an American-led multilateral force. Most specifically, they threatened to
disrupt reunification efforts by fueling fears of a German national nuclear
deterrent.
These French efforts gave support to domestic criticism of the
government's Atlanticist emphasis. The West German "Gaullists" were unwilling
to alienate France to gain more German influence over U.S. nuclear weapons; they
preferred a "European deterrent." Paradoxically, the French never agreed to the
sacrifice of autonomy required to include the West Germans in a European
deterrent.
Internal opposition existed to what was perceived as the government's
"nuclear obsession" and its effects on Germany's eventual re-unification. How
could a Germany with control of nuclear weapons hope to reconcile its differences
36
with the East and reunify? Chancellor Erhard attempted to address this question
in a Bundestag Speech:
We are thinking in terms of a joint nuclear organization, and we are
participating in relevant deliberations with allied powers. We have
repeatedly made known that we do not desire national control of nuclear
weapons.
We should, however, not be kept out of any nuclear participation simply
because we are a divided country. The partition of Germany is an injustice.
It must not be augmented by another injustice, by making it more difficult
for us—who are rendering substantial contributions to the Western alliance—
to defend ourselves against the open threat from the East. Such views
weaken the alliance and simultaneously encourage the Soviets to insist on
the partition of our continent." 1
Despite Erhard's efforts, MLF was not to be. Allied opposition
combined with internal opposition in the Federal Republic to kill the proposal.
In the end, the Americans were unwilling to force the issue enough to give it the
momentum required to overcome the opposition. The United States was reluctant
to alienate either the French or the British with dominating overtures in support
of the proposal.
3. NPG and NPT: 1966-1969
The fall of 1966 brought another change in the German leadership, and
with it a change in direction. The CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition set the wheels
^Bulletin (official English-language publication of the Press and Information
Office of the Federal Government), 16 November 1965; cited in Kelleher, Germany
and Nuclear Weapons, 261.
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in motion for the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik. Although the Grand Coalition was
constrained by its inability to obtain a consensus on several important issues,
there were a few accomplishments related to nuclear policy during these three
years.
The first major development in West German nuclear policy during this
period was the alliance's decision to formally adopt the strategy of flexible
response. Formal adoption of flexible response did not quell controversy on
nuclear strategy within the alliance, but an agreement was reached on the
requirement to emphasize a conventional force buildup.
The most effective avenue to address the divergent interests in nuclear
policy within the alliance was the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The NPG was
instituted after the failure of the MLF and conducted its first meeting in April
1967. The West Germans gained a greater appreciation for American nuclear
concerns while reexamining the rationality of strategic doctrine from the West
German perspective. The NPG provided the West Germans an alliance forum for
debate on nuclear issues. As one West German participant, General Ulrich de
Maiziere, put it:
The non-nuclear European states obtained knowledge of data not previously
available to them, as well as the knowledge of the technical conditions for
the employment of atomic weapons. They became better acquainted with
American security interests and American thinking. In turn, the Americans
were confronted afresh with European views and concerns. They deepened
their understanding of Europe's differing conditions and for the special
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problems of countries that possessed a common border with Warsaw Pact
nations."2
The primary result of this NPG debate was a report on the early use
of nuclear weapons known as the Healey-Schroder paper, after the defense
ministers of Britain and West Germany. The European compromise on flexible
response stressing a conventional buildup had heightened apprehension about the
value of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. This paper attempted to cement allied
defense strategy to the U.S. nuclear guarantee through the early, but limited use
of nuclear weapons.
Schroder used this report as a vehicle to express West German views
on the early use of nuclear weapons, their interdependence with conventional
forces, and their role in forward defense. He reiterated these ideas in a speech
to the Western European Union (WEU) stating that it was "in the European
interest that, should the necessity arise, tactical [nuclear] weapons are used in
good time."63 Addressing the conventional issue, Schroder argued "that in our
view there is an inseparable interdependence between conventional forces and
62i2Ulrich de Maiziere, Armed Forces in the NATO Alliance (Washington, DC:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, May 1976),
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tactical nuclear forces."64 Although these ideas were intended to prevent a
conventional conflict confined to Western Europe, Schroder was cognizant of the
effects of tactical nuclear weapons confined to Europe. He argued for a limited
use of nuclear weapons "as far forward as possible in order to avoid loss—and
devastation—of NATO territory."65
In an attempt to accommodate the SPD's position within the Grand
Coalition, the government modified its official stance towards the NPT. The NPT
debate began in West Germany as early as 1965 in conjunction with the MLF.
The NPT and the MLF were linked by their common aim: to stem nuclear
proliferation. Before the Grand Coalition gained control of the government, the
Christian Democrats were wary of any efforts to infringe on civilian nuclear
programs.
When the SPD entered the Grand Coalition, this position softened. The
SPD supported the NPT as the best way to achieve reunification; it would assure
the East by confirming that the Federal Republic did not intend to pursue a
national nuclear weapons program. More conservative forces in the coalition
were less willing to sacrifice the option of a future national nuclear deterrent, or
Schroder, WEU Speech, 201; cited in Daalder, 74.
Schroder, WEU Speech, 200; cited in Daalder, 74.
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the prospects for a European deterrent. In the end, an SPD-FDP government
coalition in 1969 decided to adhere to the NPT.
D. 1970-1979
The 1970-1979 period in the nuclear policy of the Federal Republic was
marked by the dominance of the SPD-first under the leadership of Willy Brandt
(1969-1974), followed by Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982). Helmut Schmidt's
influence on nuclear weapons policy is unparalleled in the history of the Federal
Republic; with the possible exception of Franz Josef Strauss, no other West
German politician has had a greater impact on nuclear strategy. First as defense
minister in 1969-1972 and then as chancellor in 1974-1982, Helmut Schmidt
dominated West German nuclear weapons policy.
1. NPT and Ostpolitik: 1970-1974
Willy Brandt was not a primary figure in the development of the
Federal Republic's nuclear weapons policy. Nevertheless, as foreign minister in
1966-1969 and as chancellor in 1969-1974, Brandt's major contribution was his
Ostpolitik, his work to improve West Germany's relation with the Warsaw Pact
countries.
In late November 1969, as one of the first major actions by his
government, Willy Brandt signed the NPT. In his memoirs Brandt summarized
his views on the treaty:
41
First, I did not want national access to nuclear weapons, and the bulk of my
countrymen agreed that we had no need of them; secondly, Europe must
not be defenceless in face of a continuing threat; and, thirdly, we must have
a say in matters that affected, or might affect, our interests. 06
Brandt was addressing his concerns about the Federal Republic's security as a
non-nuclear power. According to Brandt, the Federal Republic required a
continuing nuclear guarantee from NATO and the United States, and a level of
influence in alliance decisions commensurate with its contribution.
For many in the SPD, signing the treaty created an environment more
conducive to East-West detente and successful pursuit of the SPD's preferred
Ostpolitik. Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU)
opposition to both the NPT and Ostpolitik continued, and the SPD would have to
wait until 1975, "after Ostpolitik had become an accepted part of West German
foreign policy, to achieve formal West German ratification of the NPT."67
In 1969, Helmut Schmidt became Minister of Defense and immediately
pursued an evaluation of West German nuclear doctrine. As early as 1961,
Schmidt had been critical of NATO's reliance on rapid escalation to meet a
conventional threat.
The thesis of the inevitability of nuclear defense is deadly nonsense. . . .
Actual defense against nonnuclear (conventional) attack in Europe with
bb\Willy Brandt, People and Politics, trans. J. Maxwell Brownjohn (Boston: Little,




tactical nuclear weapons would . . . most probably be synonymous with
large-scale destruction of Europe, at least ... of Germany."68
In light of these feelings, Schmidt instituted a doctrinal change in German nuclear
strategy first formulated in his 1970 White Paper. Nuclear weapons in Europe
"must not be used except as a last resort and even then only with restraint and
on a selective basis."69
Most nuclear policy developments during Brandt's rule as Chancellor
can be attributed to Schmidt. Nevertheless, Brandt left a mark on the security
policy of the Federal Republic which lingered for two decades. Brandt had
achieved gains in improved relations with the East which would remain a
cherished accomplishment for future governments. "Indeed, the very existence
of foreign policy achievements in the East meant that the Soviets would enjoy,
and seek to capitalize on, an increased leverage over West German
policymaking."70 This paradox was destined to create havoc for future nuclear
weapons policy in the Federal Republic.
681
^Helmut Schmidt, Vertidigung oder Vergeltung, 1961; cited in Helmut Schmidt,
Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective, Trans. Ruth Hein (New York: Random
House, 1989), pp. 111-112.
69The 1970 Defense White Paper, English edition, 42; cited in Kelleher,
Germany and Nuclear Weapons, 304.
70Boutwell, 50.
43
2. End of Detente, Roots of INF: 1975-1979
By 1975, detente was losing some of its charm with the superpowers.
This presented the West Germans with difficulties in the execution of their
security policy. Balancing the requirements of Ostpolitik, arms control, and
security became a complex task for Chancellor Schmidt. It is significant that
disagreements within the SPD about how to reconcile these three priorities
produced circumstances which brought down the government of Helmut Schmidt
in 1982.
Helmut Schmidt's first White paper of 1975/1976 set the tone for the
nuclear weapons policy of his administration. It outlined the value of forward
defense, and specified the conditions for the early use of nuclear weapons.
The initial tactical use of nuclear weapons must be timed as late as possible
but as early as necessary, which is to say that the doctrine of Forward
Defence must retain its validity, the conventional forces of the defender
must not be exhausted, and incalculability must be sustained so far as the
attacker is concerned. The initial use of nuclear weapons is not intended so
much to bring about a military decision as to achieve political effect. The
intent is to persuade the attacker to reconsider his intention, to desist in his
aggression, and to withdraw.71
With these guidelines, Schmidt was attempting to provide deterrence with a
connection to the U.S. guarantee without confining the conflict to Western Europe.
71 White Paper 1975/1976: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
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In the mid-1970s, developments in the Warsaw Pact began to threaten
Schmidt's goals. NATO began to notice significant growth in Warsaw Pact forces
which was incompatible with the declared objectives of detente. : With respect
to nuclear forces these improvements were expressed in the deplovment of the
SS-20 mobile intermediate range missile. With multiple warheads, increased
accuracy, and longer range this missile was capable of conducting nuclear strikes
throughout the Federal Republic and all of Europe. Helmut Schmidt was
concerned about the political and military implications of this weapon system.
I was fed up with Brzezinski and Carter who had told me that the Russian
SS-20s did not matter at all . . . they didn't understand that the SS-20 was
a political threat, political blackmail against Germany most of all and later
on against others in Europe. 73
In London, in October 1977, Helmut Schmidt gave a speech at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in which he addressed his fears
about the SS-20's capabilities. Schmidt expressed concern that the Carter
administration's emphasis on SALT and arms control would achieve superpower
parity at the strategic level while retaining an INF74 imbalance in Europe. The
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Jeffrey Herf, War By Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and
the Battle of the Euromissiles (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 53.
^Helmut Schmidt, interview with Jeffrey Herf, New York, September 30, 1985;
cited in Herf, 54.
74The term intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) replaced long-range
theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) in the early 1980s. For the purposes of this study,
INF will be used throughout. See David S. Yost, "The History of NATO Theater
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United States would be more reluctant to escalate to the strategic level as its
superiority waned, while Soviet advantages in Europe would encourage
aggression. Schmidt sensed a lack of U.S. appreciation of the West German
strategic situation, and a resultant de-coupling of the American nuclear guarantee.
This situation was exacerbated by the "neutron bomb" controversy.
The neutron bomb, or enhanced radiation weapon (ERW), was a U.S. artillery
shell containing a discriminate nuclear weapon that would cause limited collateral
damage. ERWs with reduced blast and increased prompt radiation effects were
considered suitable for paralysing concentrated tank formations.
In the Federal Republic the debate on ERW was fierce and emotional.
Helmut Schmidt was always critical of this aspect of West German strategic
culture. He complained of "the widespread tendency in the Federal Republic to
judge military matters from an emotional standpoint and to shy away from
penetrating, complex, and rational consideration of the situation."75
Although the government attempted to highlight the potential tactical
advantages of nuclear weapons with reduced blast, it faced emotional challenges
Nuclear Force Policy: Key Findings from the Sandia Conference," Journal of
Strategic Studies, Vol.15 No.2 (June 1992), pp. 235-236.
75Helmut Schmidt, Defense or Retaliation: A German View (New York: Praeger,
1962), 98; cited in Sherri L. Wasserman, The Neutron Bomb Controversy (New York:
Praeger, 1983), 66.
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Reduced to simple formula this is a weapon which causes no, or only slight,
material damage, but "cleanly" kills man. This is to be the final progress?
Is mankind about to go crazy? . . . The neutron bomb is a symbol of the
perversion of thought. 77
Beyond these emotional arguments, there was a strategy-oriented
policy debate on the possible deployment of ERW in the Federal Republic. The
CDU/CSU argued that ERW would enhance deterrence. Because of their limited
effects, the weapons would be more usable, reducing NATO's self-deterrence. 78
The SPD argued that ERW would make nuclear weapons likely to be used sooner
in a conflict and confine nuclear war to Europe. 79 The SPD was also concerned
about sacrificing the gains of detente with a show of muscle.
The volatile nature of this issue required careful handling by
Chancellor Schmidt. He presented the government position as one committed to
a multilateral stance developed by NATO in the context of arms control measures.
76Wasserman, 67.
^Egon Bahr, "1st die Menscheit dabei, verriickt zu werden? Die
Neutronenbombe ist ein Symbol der Perversion des Denkens," Vorwdrts, no. 29,
July 21, 1977, 4; cited in Herf, 61.
78David S. Yost and Thomas C. Glad, "West German Party Politics and Theater





In his address to the Bundestag on April 13, 1978, the chancellor made clear his
preference for the sequence of events to be followed concerning ERW:
(l)a unilateral production decision by the United States; (2) the attempt at
an arms control solution; and (3) if no arms control solution were
forthcoming within two years, then the FRG would be willing to station
neutron weapons, provided the Alliance decided such deployment was
necessary and provided another NATO country also deployed ERW.80
This position was difficult politically due to opposition to nuclear modernization
within his own party and the criticism from the CDU/CSU opposition that he
was not sufficiently supporting the Americans.
Everything came to a head when President Carter decided to cancel
ERW production. "Carter had pushed the West Europeans out onto a limb in
getting them to agree to the NATO ERW compromise, only to saw the limb off
behind them."81 This intra-allied debacle would strongly influence future
security arrangements. It exemplified a lack of U.S. leadership and a lack of
allied communication and understanding.
Attempting to prevent further problems in alliance decision-making,
the Carter administration promoted greater alliance participation in nuclear
policy. The ERW debacle also transformed traditional U.S. opposition to the
modernization of INF in Europe. Although much of the initiative to deploy





modernized INF in Europe came from the Federal Republic, establishing a
domestic consensus proved problematic. The INF issue "posed a classical
dilemma between the conflicting demands of defense and detente.
"
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This balancing act required Schmidt to place certain conditions on West
Germany's position with respect to INF. The first of these was that at least one
other non-nuclear continental European power would agree to deploy missiles.
This non-singularity condition was a common theme for the Federal Republic.
Schmidt refused to have a special status imposed, since as one West German
politician explained, "we do not want to give anyone, East or West, any reason
to suspect that Germany is gaining increased access to the nuclear trigger, and
those suspicions are easy to provoke."83 The Germans also promoted the
requirement of a unanimous allied decision and the priority of arms control
negotiations.
The arms control track for the Federal Republic had a special meaning.
Pressure within the party had forced Schmidt to propose a zero option: successful
82Lunn, Simon, The Modernization of NATO's Long-range TJieater Nuclear Forces,
Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense
Division
,
Congressional Research Service. 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 31 December
1980; cited in Daalder, 183.
^U.S. Congress, Senate, SALT and the NATO Allies. A staff report to the
Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., October 1979; cited in Daalder, 184.
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arms control could avert the need for any missile deployment. As Peter Corterier,
an SPD parliamentarian, emphasized, the INF decision should aim "at a stable
nuclear balance of power and at closing any gaps in our deterrent capability in
Europe. Where this can be achieved with arms control arrangements, this should
take priority over the introduction of new weapons systems."84 NATO's dual-
track decision in December 1979 reflected these West German conditions. The
dual-track decision marked the beginning of a traumatic period for nuclear
weapons policy in the Federal Republic.
E. 1980-1989
The 1980s saw the end of SPD dominance of nuclear security policy and the
emergence of Helmut Kohl and the CDU/CSU. The INF debate destroyed
Schmidt's political consensus as the SPD drifted too far left for many West
Germans. It required a CDU/CSU-led government to complete the INF process
that Schmidt began. In the great tradition of Adenauer, Helmut Kohl used this
position of strength to carry the Federal Republic's security policy through the
destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and reunification in 1990.
84i
*U.S. Congress, House, Western Security Issues: European Perspectives. Hearing
before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and
Europe and the Middle East. Committee on Foreign Affairs. 96th cong., 1st Sess.,
12 September 1979, 16; cited in Daalder, 203.
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Discussion of this period is divided into two sections. The first is dominated
by the INF debate and concludes in 1983. The second section follows the
aftermath of INF to the breaking of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.
1. The INF Debate: 1980-1983
The essence of NATO's two-track decision in December 1979 was four
years of arms control negotiations to alleviate the European INF imbalance. If
these negotiations failed, missile deployment would follow in late 1983. For the
Federal Republic, these four years were filled with divisive public debate in the
Bundestag, among intellectuals, and in the streets.
The government and more conservative forces justified the two track
decision as a means to couple European theater nuclear forces to the American
strategic deterrent. Soviet strategic parity combined with INF superiority in
Europe threatened the Western Europeans with nuclear blackmail. If the
imbalance could not be rectified through negotiations, Western missile
deployments were required to convince Soviet strategic planners that they could
not isolate Europe from the United States strategic guarantee.
Members of the CDU/CSU opposition supported the government's
position, but cautioned against a neutral drift within the SPD. Franz Josef Strauss
warned, "detente must not be allowed to contribute to a political-psychological
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neutralization or to a dismantling of the will for defense." 85 Strauss was alluding
to a perceived trend on the part of a faction of the SPD to emphasize detente over
defense.
Examples of this trend can be drawn from the opposition to the NATO
decision. Numerous initiatives from peace movements concentrated on the
dangers of nuclear war. Others directed blame against the Americans for
allegedly increasing East-West tensions and supposedly attempting to confine
nuclear war to Europe. This growing revolt within the SPD was addressed by
Helmut Schmidt as follows:
He who neglects the balance of forces is an illusionist who endangers the
peace. . . . With all my force, I will work against a policy of inferiority and
against a policy of Western superiority. . . . You must finally stop acting as
if the Americans were our enemies and the Russians our friends. . . . There
is no reason to believe that we would be better off under the "protection" of
a communist dictatorship than we are at present.86
Additional INF opposition forces began to draw the SPD into a more
neutral position. These groups underscored West Germany's unique position and
status in relation to the nuclear superpowers. Giinter Grass highlighted the
special responsibility of the two German states in promoting peace and
85Franz Josef Strauss, Deutscher Bundestag-8 Wahlperiode-196 Sitzung (January
17, 1980), 15613; cited in Herf, 118.
86Helmut Schmidt, "Damit stehe und fall ich," Vorwarts, no.22, May 21, 1981,
5; cited in Herf, pp. 125-126.
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disarmament.6 ' Egon Bahr emphasized West Germany's sovereign interests as
a non-nuclear power, promoting the slogan "no nuclear weapons for non-nuclear
states."
88
Similar to the Kampf dem Atomtod in the late fifties, during the INF
controversy, the protest movement took its message to the streets. In 1981 protest
movements organized massive rallies with hundreds of thousands in attendance
all over West Germany and much of the rest of Western Europe. 89 This was
followed by passive resistance in the form of "tax resistance, fasts and hunger
strikes, and nonviolent encirclement of NATO and U.S. military installations" in
1982 and 1983.90
Domestic political difficulties combined with fears of a divided and
neutral SPD forced Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Free
Democratic Party (FDP) to switch allegiance and form a government with the
CDU/CSU. The new governing coalition under CDU/CSU leadership took the
lead with the INF issue in the fall of 1982, confirming their public mandate in the
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general election of March 1983. Debate continued on the same lines from both
camps throughout 1983, culminating in the final arguments presented prior to the
decisive vote in the Bundestag in November 1983.
It was clear at this point that the SPD had rejected Schmidt's decision
of 1979, and in the process had destroyed chances for a negotiated solution. The
Soviets had no reason to make concessions at the negotiating table when a large
portion of the West German opposition did not support INF deployment. The
SPD and the Greens had inadvertently played into the hands of the Soviets by
advocating a neutralization of the West German security position and steering the
Federal Republic away from the Western alliance.
The government presented its arguments with an extensive description
of the INF issue in the 1983 White Paper published just prior to the final
Bundestag debate. The White Paper included an extensive evaluation of the
Soviet threat and of the implications of this threat for the West German security
situation.
The situation of NATO has become more difficult: the Warsaw Pact's
growing conventional superiority in Europe has increased NATO's
dependence on the timely introduction of overseas reinforcements and on
the nuclear component of the deterrent.
At the same time, the credibility of the nuclear deterrence has become
more problematic owing both to the increasing superiority of the Soviet
Union in intermediate-range and short-range nuclear weapons in Europe
and to the decreasing acceptance of nuclear weapons in Western societies.
If these two unfavorable trends continue they will seriously jeopardize the
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credibility of our deterrent and defence posture and critically aggravate our
security situation.91
J
The SPD developed its final position in a conference just prior to the
Bundestag debate. The Social Democrats asserted that not all avenues had been
pursued in the negotiation process. The SPD rejected accusations that it was
neutralist, and argued that the West German position on security issues diverged
from that of the nuclear superpowers.92 In short, the SPD rejected increasing the
number of nuclear weapons deployed on German soil. In the opinion of many
members of the SPD, nuclear weapons which could quickly reach the Soviet
Union from German soil jeopardized the accomplishments of Ostpolitik.
Although Helmut Schmidt pleaded against reversing his decision, the SPD voted
against deployment.
Helmut Kohl rallied the more conservative coalition under the
Adenauer banner of strong connections to the West. Reducing the issue to an
almost ideological conflict against dictatorships, Kohl led the Federal Republic to
full implementation of the two track decision of 1979.
Those who are weak encourage hegemonical claims and call forth threats.
They expose themselves to blackmail and place at risk their freedom and
thus also peace. Only the determination of free peoples can show
91 White Paper 1983: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bonn: The




totalitarian states their limits. We can never allow peace and freedom to be
played off against one another.93
2. Aftermath, Including the Reykjavik Summit and the INF Treaty:
1983-1989
A major facet of the INF struggle's aftermath was the significant Soviet
role. The Soviets had grand designs in Western Europe, as pointed out by the
head of the Planning Department in the West German Foreign Ministry, Konrad
Seitz:
The threat engendered by Soviet over-armament is not only of a military
nature. It is also of a politico-psychological nature. The Soviet weapons
are intended to project a political shadow, and in actual fact do project this
shadow over Europe. Today the primary danger in Europe is not
aggression and open warfare. We risk rather to see permanently modified, to the
advantage of the Soviet Union, the force balances in Europe and the world. At the
end of this process, the European democracies would see themselves
constrained to self-neutralization. The Soviet Union would have won political
control over Western Europe without having had to fire a shot.[Emphasis
added.]94
In David Yost's assessment, the Soviet efforts did not achieve their
main goals during the INF affair in West Germany, but nonetheless contributed
93Helmut Kohl, Deutscher Bundestag-10 Wahlperiode-35 Sitzung, (November 21,
1983), 2331; cited in Herf, 207.
94Konrad Seitz, "Deutsch-franzosische sicherheitspolitische Zusammenarbeit,"
Europa-Archiv, 37(25 November 1982): 663; cited in David S. Yost, "The Soviet
Campaign against INF in West Germany," chap, in Brian D. Dailey and Patrick
J. Parker, eds., Soviet Strategic Deception, (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and
Company/ Lexington Books, 1987), 344.
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to significant developments. 95 The Soviets helped to polarize and undermine the
previous political consensus on defense policy. During this period the SPD
moved away from key NATO policies. The Soviets were probably influential in
the delegitimization of NATO nuclear policy with respect to the U.S. nuclear
presence in Western Europe and the Western approach to nuclear arms control.
The Soviets also contributed to a socialization process for members of the
successor generations in West Germany; many members of the younger
generations became more skeptical about the reality of the Soviet threat.
The Soviet Union was not immune to the effects of the INF affair.
Although the Soviets walked out on the negotiations in 1983, the reality of NATO
alliance resolve obliged them to return to the negotiating table in 1985. One
major stepping stone in this negotiating process was the Reykjavik summit in
1986. The superpowers made some progress towards an agreement eliminating
INF in Europe and spoke of the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. In
the opinion of many West European experts and officials, too much progress was
made in the wrong direction without any prior consultation.
Chancellor Kohl reacted quite negatively to the developments at
Reykjavik. Talk of eliminating nuclear weapons challenged the very essence of
the primacy of nuclear deterrence professed by the CDU/CSU leadership. In
95The remainder of this paragraph is indebted to the chapter by David S. Yost,
"The Soviet Campaign against INF in West Germany."
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meetings with President Reagan after the summit, Kohl reminded the president
that "the NATO strategy of flexible response would be deprived of its credibility
unless, in connection with the question of strategic missiles the issue of Soviet
superiority in the conventional field is put on the table at the same time."96
Defense Minister Manfred Worner was reluctant to include German owned
Pershing-I missiles in the treaty negotiations.97 These initial reservations from
Bonn eventually subsided with pressure from the allies. With assurances on
future negotiations for shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (SRINF),
Bonn finally accepted the INF treaty. The Federal Republic agreed to dismantle
and withdraw the Pershing-I missiles after the implementation of the INF treaty.
The INF treaty was not popular with many West German officials,
politicians, and experts. As Ronald Asmus explains:
Leading West German conservatives feared that the "double zero" agreement
had produced a situation where the remaining nuclear systems on West
German soil were decoupling, where the FRG remained vulnerable to
massive Soviet superiority in short-range systems, and where future
modernization of nuclear weapons on German soil would be politically
more difficult in the wake of INF. . . . These trends have only strengthened
convictions that the status quo, in terms of nuclear systems stationed in the
FRG, is neither desirable nor tenable; that pressures for further reductions
are likely to increase rather than decrease; and that Bonn must act to control
%
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this process and steer it in a direction that better corresponds to German
military and political interests. 98
Chancellor Kohl reacted to this sentiment by more aggressively
asserting West Germany's interests with respect to nuclear policy. He pushed
hard for negotiations on SRINF, conventional forces, and chemical weapons. Kohl
postponed decisions on the modernization of nuclear forces to avoid sending the
wrong signal in an atmosphere of disarmament." A final example of Bonn's
assertiveness was Kohl's reaction during the WINTEX exercise of March 1989.
West German participants in this exercise stalled at a crucial juncture when the
U.S. reportedly refused to change a targeting plan in which nuclear weapons were
targeted on West German soil. In the exercise a follow-on nuclear strike was
proposed to stop a Soviet conventional advance. In this strike some of the
nuclear weapons were targeted on West German soil and West German
participants stalled the proceedings, apparently under the orders of Chancellor
Kohl, in order to avoid the need for a decision. 100 This episode underscored
Bonn's growing reluctance to sacrifice important interests and its determination
to assert its own policy preferences in alliance decision-making.
98Ronald Asmus, "West Germany Faces Nuclear Modernization," Survival
Vol.30 (Nov/Dec 1988): 502.
"Daalder, 278.
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The analysis of the role of nuclear deterrence in West German security
policy over the last four decades has highlighted continuities which may apply
to the post-Cold War environment as well. The Federal Republic will continue
to assert its national interests within a multi-lateral framework, avoiding the
political drawbacks of singularization. German security policy will continue to
balance the European and transatlantic partnerships while avoiding the
drawbacks of a national nuclear deterrent.
The Federal Republic made quite a transition in security policy—from a
position of complete reliance on allied support in 1949, when it was founded, to
a more self-confident posture as the Berlin wall was crumbling in 1989. The West
Germans had grudgingly adopted flexible response in 1967, cautiously accepted
plans for the deployment of the neutron bomb in 1978, and ambivalently
approved the double-zero agreement on INF in 1987. 101 By 1988, the Federal
Republic began to assert itself more openly within the alliance and was no longer
willing to sacrifice German interests quietly.
In the forty years of West German nuclear policy, certain common themes
stand out. First and foremost, West Germans have generally expressed an
aversion to a national nuclear deterrent. Throughout West Germany's past, the
101Daalder, 283.
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gains of an autonomous deterrent force have never outweighed the probable
losses. Living under the umbrella of NATO's nuclear guarantee, primarily
provided by the United States, has been difficult at times, but effective.
When formulating security policy, the Federal Republic was forced to
delicately balance the interests of its European neighbors with those of the United
States. For the most part the West Germans were successful in this endeavor due
to their powerful influence. In the rare cases when the West Germans were
obliged by circumstances to make a decision between the two sides, their
preference was to delay the decision for as long as possible and in the end to
favor the Americans.
Another basic theme in West German nuclear policy is its emphasis on
deterrence. In some respects this stems from a realization that the use of nuclear
weapons in Europe would be disastrous for the Germans. The Federal Republic
has continually promoted an ambiguous policy on the use of nuclear weapons in
the event of a failure of deterrence. An insight into this theme was revealed by
Helmut Schmidt in his memoirs; he explained his reluctance to use nuclear
weapons as follows:
As commanding officer, I was therefore fully determined to give no
assistance whatever to Western escalation of nuclear warfare in the
(unlikely) case of a Soviet conventional attack. Nevertheless, I thought it
prudent not to say so; it was, after all, conceivable that some uncertainty
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about possible Western reaction might well have a deterrent effect on the
Soviet Union. 102
Another continual theme of West German nuclear policy was the difficult
balance between defense and detente. The Federal Republic's security and
defense policy was often at odds with the goal of reunification. The concept of
non-singularity is related to this concern. West German policy-makers demanded
a shared responsibility within the alliance on difficult political decisions to avoid
being singled out for propaganda purposes. Bonn wished to provide West
German nuclear policy a multilateral umbrella to battle the inevitable Soviet
charges of a revanchist Federal Republic. Nevertheless, the core of the West
German nuclear dilemma during this era was the grave risk the Federal Republic
experienced from the possible use of nuclear weapons in an East-West conflict
while so highly dependent on the actions and decisions of others. 103
102Schmidt, Men and Powers, 111.
103Boutwell, 218.
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III. GERMAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
POLICIES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE
A. INTRODUCTION
The future security policy of the Federal Republic is closely tied to relations
with its European neighbors. The trend towards European unity, however rocky
it may appear at times, raises questions about greater European cooperation in
defense policy. For the Federal Republic, the question is whether this cooperation
will carry over into the nuclear realm, and whether the Germans would rely on
nuclear protection from West European alliance partners.
This chapter specifically addresses the West European countries with a
national deterrent force: France and the United Kingdom. The text begins with
a survey of the nuclear capabilities and policies of the United Kingdom and
France. The chapter concludes with German perspectives on these nuclear
deterrent forces.
B. UNITED KINGDOM
This section surveys the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent policy. The
background discussion emphasizes the decision-making behind the deterrent,
several British justifications for maintaining the deterrent, the unique role that
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British forces play in NATO, Britain's close relationship with and dependence on
the United States, and public opinion regarding the nuclear deterrent. The section
concludes with a brief overview of British nuclear forces and a discussion of
Britain's domestic political debate.
1. Background of Deterrence
British decisions on nuclear forces are subject to limited public scrutiny.
"Small groups of top-level politicians within the Cabinet, supported by a strong
professional civil service, have historically been able to make critical nuclear
decisions quietly." 104 This critical decision-making in the 1940s and 1950s led
to the development of Britain's own nuclear force.
Nuclear weapons were an avenue to a "seat at the top table" for the
United Kingdom from the onset. The British utilized nuclear weapons in an
attempt to retain the "great power" status that was deteriorating after World War
II and the independence of India. This is exemplified
in the interest the British have taken in organizing, together with the United
States and the Soviet Union, nuclear arms control regimes such as the PTBT
[Partial Test Ban Treaty] and the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty], and in the
British reluctance even to consider the possibility of allowing France to be
the sole [West] European nuclear power. 105
104i
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The British were the first "to recognize the practical possibility of
building nuclear weapons, and turned to the United States for help in bringing
the project to fruition.
"
106
This was the beginning of a cooperative nuclear
relationship that (although severely strained at times) has continued for half a
century. With this relationship the United Kingdom has "enjoyed uniquely
privileged access to U.S. nuclear secrets and weapons, but [is] the only nuclear
power without a [strategic] delivery system of its own [manufacture]." 107
Britain's interdependence with the United States and NATO provides
the British with a "special status within the alliance based on their unique roles
and responsibilities." 108 The United Kingdom accepts the presence of U.S.
nuclear weapons on British soil, plans for the potential employment of U.S.
nuclear weapons in cooperation with British forces on German soil, and maintains
British nuclear weapons at home and in Germany. British nuclear forces in
Germany, although assigned to NATO, do not provide the extended deterrence
that American forces provide. The United Kingdom is reluctant to explicitly
Wb
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"acknowledge that it has made the [nuclear] commitment [to Germany] or to offer
guidance on how seriously it ought to be taken." 109
One aspect of this unique role is London's desire to maintain a
"second-center of decision." This theory proposes that an adversary would be
forced to take into account both the American and British political decision-
makers when challenging NATO's nuclear resolve. As explained by the British
Secretary of Defense in January 1980:
The nuclear decision, whether as a matter of retaliatory response or in
another circumstance, would, of course, be no less agonising for the United
Kingdom than for the United States. But it would be a decision of a
separate and independent Power, and a Power whose survival in freedom
might be more directly and closely threatened by aggression in Europe than
that of the United States. This is where the fact of having to face two
decision-makers instead of one is of such significance.
Soviet leaders would have to assess that there was a greater chance of
one of them using its nuclear capability than if there were a single decision
maker across the Atlantic. The risk to the Soviet Union would be
inescapably higher and less calculable. This is just another way of saying
that the deterrence of the Alliance as a whole would be stronger, the more
credible and therefore the more effective. 110
The British also justify their nuclear forces within the context of self-
reliance. London is not inclined to sacrifice its autonomy under the nuclear
109Lawrence Freedman, "Britain's Nuclear Commitment to Germany," in
British-German Defence Cooperation: Partners within the Alliance, eds. Karl Kaiser and
John Roper (London: Jane's, 1988), 186.
uoHouse of Commons Official Report, Vol. 977. cols. 678-9 (24 January 1980),
quoted in Freedman, 187.
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umbrella of the United States. As former Prime Minister Thatcher stated,
"Nuclear deterrence is the only means allowing small countries in effect to stand
up to big countries
. . . Historically, Great Britain [has] had occasion to stand
alone.'" 11
Critics of the British theories of self-reliance and "second-center of
decision" question London's ability to take nuclear action independent of
Washington. Some of these political forces would renounce nuclear weapons in
the United Kingdom. Britain has a political tradition that has,
Since the nineteenth century included significant pacifist and idealist strains,
manifest in the twentieth century mainly in the Liberal and Labour parties.
This idealist current is prone to the belief that Britain is uniquely fitted to
offer the world a moral example of restraint in military affairs, including a
degree of unilateral disarmament. 112
Strong public support for the British nuclear deterrent forced the
Labour Party to reverse its stance on unilateral disarmament in October 1989.
Seventy percent of the British favor retaining Britain's nuclear forces.
113
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Nevertheless, the Labour party retains a strong anti-nuclear influence with two-
thirds of Labour voters favoring a non-nuclear defense policy. 114
2. British Nuclear Forces
The United Kingdom's strategic nuclear force consists of four nuclear
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). These submarines are planned to be
replaced by a more capable fleet of four SSBNs in the mid 1990s. The British also
maintain dual-capable aircraft with free-fall nuclear bombs. London intends to
replace these bombs with a more credible, long range air-launched missile in the
late 1990s. 115
Both of these modernization programs are embroiled in controversy. Some
argue that present international conditions, such as superpower disarmament, do
not justify the continuation of Britain's modernization programs. The first of four
planned SSBNs was unveiled in early March 1992; two more are under
construction, but the fourth is in jeopardy. The missile program is a sensitive
issue because there is pressure to cooperate with France on procurement, and to
114cStephen F. Szabo, West European Public Perceptions of Security Issues: A Survey
of Attitudes in France, the FRG, Great Britain and Italy over Three Decades, Office of
Research, U.S. Information Agency, July 1988, 32-33; quoted in Yost, Strategic
Culture, 69.
115For a more technical accounting of Western nuclear forces see David S. Yost,
"Western Nuclear Force Structures," in Nuclear Weapons and the Future of European
Security, ed. Beatrice Heuser, (London: Brassey's for the Centre for Defence
Studies, Kings College, University of London, 1991).
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many this implies possibly risking the "special relationship" with the United
States. The cost involved with the program is significant, partly because Britain
is experiencing its worst recession since the 1930s.
3. Domestic Political Debate
The debate over nuclear deterrence gained new momentum in the
United Kingdom with the elections of 9 April 1992. The opposition Labour Party
used the SSBN modernization as an issue against the governing Conservative
Party. 116 Emotional issues such as international arms control and shipyard
workers losing jobs set the tone for the domestic political debate on the future of
nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom.
a. Conservative Party
The British government, as presently constituted, supports the
continued modernization of the United Kingdom's strategic and sub-strategic
forces. The British Defence Secretary summarized the party's position in a
proposal to the House of Commons:
That this House supports unequivocally the concept of nuclear deterrence
and the retention of a credible United Kingdom nuclear deterrent, while
other countries have, or seek to acquire, nuclear weapons; note the great
dangers apparent in the increase in the number of countries gaining or
seeking to gain, access to nuclear weapons; understands that the country's
nuclear deterrent remains essential for the defence of the United Kingdom
116Alexander MacLeod, "Britain's Nuclear Deterrent Questioned by Opposition
as US, Russia Make Cuts," The Christian Science Monitor, 30 January 1992, 3.
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and NATO; recognizes the vital contribution to world peace which the
United Kingdom's nuclear forces have made, and will continue to make,
through deterrence; and supports NATO's policy of also maintaining an up-
to-date, sub-strategic nuclear capability based in Europe. 117
The conflicts between the Conservatives and the opposition arise
in the details of the modernization plans. The new SSBNs have the capability to
increase the number of warheads carried over their predecessors. The
government plans to increase the warheads, but not to the maximum number
capable for each missile. "This expression of self-restraint . . . may be partly
explained by cost factors and by a desire to make it clear that Britain has no
interest in pursuing disproportionate strategic ambitions." 118
An atmosphere of restricting strategic ambitions has placed the
requirement for the fourth British SSBN into question, at least in some opposition
circles. The government is, however, not inclined to cancel its order for the fourth
SSBN. The Conservatives stress the requirement for four boats to maintain a
viable deterrent. Cancelling the fourth boat would also jeopardize four thousand
jobs in a crucial voting district for their party. 119
^Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (Commons). Vol. 201, no. 39 (14 January
1992), columns 817-818.
118
Yost, Western Nuclear Force Structures, 26-27.
119MacLeod, 3.
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The present government plans for sub-strategic modernization are
also a point of contention with the opposition. The government is concerned
about the deterrent effect of outdated weapons. London values sub-strategic
nuclear weapons in Europe for their flexibility of response. The British
government has indicated that air-launched stand-off missiles may provide the
appropriate form of modernization for Britain's contribution to NATO's sub-
strategic forces. 120 Defense Minister Malcolm Rifkind recently indicated that the
United Kingdom may be considering alternative replacements in the sub-strategic
nuclear realm, possibly in the form of single-shot, single-warhead possibilities for
Trident SLBMs. 121
b. Labour Party
The mainstream view of the Labour party with respect to nuclear
weapons is a bit ambiguous. Owing perhaps to the political weight of the anti-
nuclear members, the party's policy is vague. The Labour policy is based on
120Paragraphs 6 and 9 of "Deterrence after the INF Treaty," United Kingdom
Ministry of Defence Statement of the Defence Estimates 1989.
121Rifkind refers to alternatives in Michael Witt, "British Nukes Decision Will
Not Affect TASM," Defense News, 22-28 June 1992, 10; Trident alternatives are
from Nick Cook, "R.N. Probes Tactical Role For Trident," Janes Defence Weekly, 9
May 1992, 789 and U.K. Parliament, Official Report (Commons), 20 May 1992, Vol.
208, column 187.
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arms control and reduction negotiations involving the eight nuclear powers,
a strengthened and extended nuclear non-proliferation treaty backed by
sanctions, [and! a comprehensive test-ban treaty. 122
In this proposal there is no specific mention of the Labour party's
position on the modernization of the strategic and sub-strategic nuclear weapons.
In January 1992, however,
Labour's foreign affairs spokesman, Gerald Kaufman, speaking after Bush's
[January 1992] State of the Union address, confirmed that if his party wins
the general election ... it will review Britain's Trident program. 123
In the spirit of further reductions the opposition is unwilling to
increase the number of warheads carried by the Trident missiles. As articulated
by a Liberal Democrat 124 (a position supported by the Labour Party):
If Polaris currently provides an effective contribution to minimum
deterrence within NATO, why is it necessary to increase the number of
warheads available with Trident by what may be a factor of three? 125
The opposition perceives a program that will increase Britain's nuclear capability
as hypocritical at a time when Britain is combatting proliferation.
122Gerald Kaufman, in Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (Commons). Vol. 201, no.
39 (14 January 1992), column 829.
123MacLeod, 3.
124The Liberal Democrats are an alternative opposition party that may gain
fifteen percent of the electorate and play a crucial role in a stalemate election.
125Menzies Campbell, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (Commons). Vol. 201, no.
39 (14 January 1992), column 853.
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The opposition appears to be even less supportive of the proposed
air-launched stand-off missile. The missile program has not progressed as far as
the Trident program. It may be difficult to justify committing to the missile
program in these times of fiscal constraint. "A Labour Government might choose
to keep the Trident programme on the grounds that it had gone beyond the point
of no return, and cancel the possibility of an air-launched system as a concession
to its anti-nuclear supporters." 126
The Labour party has a vocal and influential anti-nuclear
constituency. The controversy within the Labour party has been mentioned by
the British Secretary of State for Defence in debate; Tom King quoted a journalist,
Martin Jacques, as follows:
The Labour party has virtually abstained from the post cold war debate on
defence. Paralysed by the memory of the 1983 and 1987 elections, its only
concern is to reassure. Labour does not want a defence debate: the very-
mention of defence sends it running for cover. 127
126
Yost, Western Nuclear Force Structures, 27-28.
127Martin Jacques, quoted by Secretary of State for Defence Tom King in
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (Commons). Vol. 201, no. 39 (14 January 1992),
column 826.
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According to Martin Holmes' analysis, the Conservative party has been quite
successful in portraying the Labour opposition as soft on defense in recent
elections. 128
The anti-nuclear constituency in the Labour party questions the
judgment of strategists and politicians who discern stabilizing effects in nuclear
weapons. These Labour party members do not believe that war can be prevented
by nuclear deterrence. They want to cut the defense budget, and nuclear
weapons are their first big target. Certain members question the validity of the
nuclear deterrent:
Has anyone re-examined the deterrent argument? Argentina attacked a
nuclear state—Britain—when it went into the Falklands. Did nuclear
weapons deter Galtieri? Not on your life. He knew that we could not use
them against him. Saddam Hussein defied an ultimatum from two nuclear
states—the United States and Britain. Did nuclear weapons deter him? Not
on your life. He dropped some scuds on another nuclear state—Israel. Did
nuclear weapons deter him? Not on your life. The whole deterrent
argument is a fraud. 129
Under the leadership of Neil Kinnock the Labour Party has
attempted to appear more mainstream and has publicly supported the United
Kingdom's nuclear deterrent. The party has not been completely successful in
,28Martin Holmes, "The British Defense Debate: The Domestic Political
Context," British Security Policy and the Atlantic Alliance: Prospect for the 1990s,
Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., (New York: Pergamon, 1987), 13.
129Tony Benn, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (Commons). Vol. 201, no. 39 (14
January 1992), column 863.
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shaking off its reputation of supporting unilateral nuclear disarmament in the
past:
A group of 30 or 40 Labour MPs continue to believe that Britain should
renounce nuclear weapons. If Labour were to win the general election with
only a modest majority, this group of unilateral nuclear disarmers could
expect to have political influence out of proportion to their numbers. 1 30
In view of the Conservative victory in the April 1992 elections, it
is likely that the British will continue their nuclear modernization as planned.
The perception of a lack of credible sub-strategic nuclear options to NATO
planners is unsettling to some officials in London. The air-launched stand-off
missile may be selected as a replacement for free-fall bombs, although the
controversy remains over whether it should be pursued with France or the United
States.
131 The political climate may make the Trident single-shot, single-
warhead sub-strategic modernization option more feasible. 132
C. FRANCE
This section on France also begins with a survey of the background of
deterrence. The background discussion emphasizes the decision making
structures, the French desire for great power status, the unique independent
130MacLeod, 3.
131
"Deterrence after INF," paragraphs 6 and 9.
132Witt, 10; Cook, 789; and Official Report (Commons), column 187.
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nature of the deterrent, the declaratory policy, deterrence theories, and the unique
French historical experience. The section concludes with an overview of French
nuclear forces and judgements about the future.
1. Background of Deterrence
The evolution of the French nuclear deterrent has proceeded under
three separate constitutional decision-making structures. Political instability and
frequent governmental changes complicated matters during the Third and Fourth
Republics. Nevertheless, the basis was laid for further developments under the
Fifth Republic.
The constitution of the Fifth Republic has since 1958 provided for a
relatively weak National Assembly and Senate, and the powers of the
President are especially strong with respect to the direction of foreign and
military policy—so much so that French experts have themselves described
the system as a "nuclear monarchy." 133
French Presidents in the Fifth Republic have enjoyed an authoritative
position in defining nuclear strategy unparalleled in other Western nuclear
powers. Although this position has been challenged at times by both the Prime
Minister and the National Assembly, the President's supreme role has generally
133Samy Cohen, La monarchie nucleaire: Les Coulisses de la politique etrangere sous
la Ve Republique (Paris: Hachette, 1986); quoted in Yost, Strategic Culture, 25.
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been respected to date. 134 The Fifth Republic produced a decision-making
structure which provides viability and continuity to the French nuclear deterrent.
Much like the British, the French obtained nuclear weapons partly
because of their interest in great power status. France's autonomous nuclear
accomplishments and preoccupation with rank and status add a unique element
to the French deterrent. In the words of a former French defense minister,
nuclear weapons have made France "indisputably, the world's third military
power." 135
The French have attempted to develop an independent nuclear force
with an array of launch platforms comparable to a nuclear superpower. As
Lawrence Freedman has noted, "France's independence has been expensive—
a
regular twenty percent of the defence budget. Britain's expenditure has been a
few percent of a comparable budget." 136
France has used this position to maintain a special non-integrated
status within NATO. The French insist on a "distinctly independent security
134David S. Yost, "Mitterrand and Defense and Security Policy," French Politics
& Society, Vol.9, Nos. 3-4 (Summer/Fall 1991): 149.
135Former Defense Minister Jean Pierre Chevenement interview in Le Monde,
July 14, 1988, 11; quoted in Yost, Strategic Culture, 27.
136Lawrence Freedman, paper in U.K. Parliament. "Anglo/French Defence
Cooperation," Sessional Papers (Commons), 1991-92, Defence Committee, 27
November 1991, 18.
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status" in order to avoid "commitments that might tie their hands and limit their
options." 137 This sentiment is exemplified in the French reluctance to accept the
deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on French soil or to base French nuclear
weapons on German soil. The French cherish their autonomy in decision-making,
and they consistently separate their deterrent force from NATO.
The French insist on these same distinctions in their declaratory policy.
French leaders emphasize:
That their nuclear strategy and employment policy are not in any way a
subset of NATO strategy and policy. France's nuclear strategy , they say,
is intended for deterrence and foresees only a limited and prompt "ultimate
warning" employment of "pre-strategic" nuclear weapons. 138
France also maintains a complex group of theories supporting the
independent nature of its nuclear deterrent. In the past these theories,
"proportional deterrence" and national nuclear "sanctuarization," implied that
France might have to face the Soviet Union alone. 139 These theories implied that
French territory could be protected from an aggressor independent of the
remainder of Europe. The justification for this "sanctuarization" was that the fear
137
Yost, Strategic Culture, 31-32.
138David S. Yost, "France in the New Europe," Foreign Affairs vol. 69 (Winter
1990/1991), 120.
139>
'Yost, Strategic Culture, 37.
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of French nuclear retaliation would outweigh the aggressor's territorial desires in
France.
Much criticism was directed against this deterrence theory. Some
questioned the ability of France to separate itself from the battle in the narrow
region of Central Europe. Others challenged the relevance of France's nuclear
deterrent in a superpower conflict. According to Lothar Riihl,
It is possible . . . that the simple threat of using nuclear weapons on the part
of the medium power would decide the USSR to eliminate [as far as
possible] this danger by a preventive nuclear attack without letting herself
be influenced in her war strategy against her principal adversary . . . But the
threat or use of [French] nuclear weapons could not deter the USSR as soon
as the Soviet government had accepted the risk of an American nuclear
retaliation in unleashing military aggression (with or without initial use of
nuclear weapons). 140
In other words, it was argued that France's independent stance placed its nuclear
deterrent in a position of questionable viability between two superpower arsenals.
French deterrent doctrine has relied on a link between its "pre-strategic
ultimate warning" and its strategic forces. In the view of the French, a potential
aggressor would not risk the nuclear escalation that might take place in a conflict
with the French. The French emphasize the war-prevention effects of nuclear
140iLothar Riihl, La politique militaire de la cinquieme republique (Paris: Foundation
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 190-191; quoted in David S. Yost, France's
Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, Part II: Strategic and Arms Control
Implications, Adelphi Paper No.185 (London: The International Institute For
Strategic Studies, 1985), 23.
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weapons to such an extent that thev are considered weapons that will never be
used.
France may take this extreme position on its nuclear deterrent due to
its distinct national experience regarding war. 141 "Britain has not been invaded
since 1066, and the last invasion of the continental United States was in 1814." 142
The French experienced the humiliating Nazi occupation and division in 1940-
1944. A nuclear deterrent that makes war unthinkable and shelters the country
from outside aggression is vital to their national interest.
The determination of the French regarding an independent deterrent
can also be attributed to their military experience, specifically their reliance on
allies. "France has not won a major war on her own since the Napoleonic period,
and one might hypothesize that allies remind the French of their dependence and
weakened capacity for national security autonomy." 143 According to Giscard
d'Estaing,
There is no contradiction between belonging to an alliance and pursuing an
independent policy ... If France were to align itself with some other
country's policy, its policy would be simple, but it would cease to exist.
Seen from the outside, France would become the province of a superpower
141






[that is, the United States]. This is not what our history teaches us [to
accept], nor is it what our people want. 144
France's experiences with allies in World War I and World War II reinforced
French skepticism about reliance on allies.
The French war experiences with Germany are a strong determinant
in their deterrent policy. France was invaded by the Germans three times in less
than a century (1870, 1914, 1940). Frenchmen generally agree that Germany must
remain a non-nuclear country. "For some Frenchman, it appears France's nuclear
weapons status compensates for Germany's economic and demographic
superiority over France." 145
A discussion of the French nuclear deterrent is incomplete without
analyzing the influence of Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle is a striking symbol of
France's historical experience. It was de Gaulle's leadership that produced the
legacy that surrounds the nuclear deterrent. His nuclear posture was "central to
the idea of France's restored status, grandeur, and autonomy." 146
144/Giscard d'Estaing, television interview of 26 February 1980, in La Politique
Etrangere de la France, Textes et documents, ler trimestre 1980 (Paris: Documentation
Franchise, 1980), pp. 105-106; cited in David S. Yost, "The Defense Policy of
France," draft of August 1992, 18.
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The French have been the Western country with the strongest
consensus behind their nuclear deterrent. 147 The support of the Socialist Party
since 1978 has helped to raise public support to majorities between sixty-seven
and seventy-two percent. 148 The end of the Cold War has, however, stimulated
discussion within the Socialist Party on defense reductions. Differences exist
between the Gaullists and the Socialists on certain weapons systems, but the
nuclear forces retain widespread support in French politics, with the principal
exception of the ecology-oriented movements. Much of this stature stems from
the legacy that the weapons possess through their association with de Gaulle.
2. French Nuclear Forces
The French have succeeded in producing a nuclear force that has
matched the superpowers in most delivery modes. Their triad includes 5 SSBNs,
18 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), and multiple strategic air
assets.
149 The French also maintain "pre-strategic" assets in the form of air-
delivered weapons. The submarine program is considered the most survivable
portion of this deterrent force.
u7
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148Michel Dobry, "Le jeu du consensus," Pouvoirs, no.38, 1986, 62; quoted in
Yost, Strategic Debate, 69.




The future of the French nuclear deterrent appears to be more in
question than at any other time in its history. It was designed to deter the
massive Soviet forces, and with the dissolution of the Soviet Union it seems to
have lost its original strategic raison d'etre. Nevertheless, the French will not
surrender one of their prize accomplishments and vital security mechanisms. It
is probable that some systems will be reduced or their modernization slowed, but
it is unlikely that any drastic changes will occur in their deterrent force.
The French are faced with quite a challenge as they mold their
deterrent to meet the challenges of an evolving European security environment.
They must continue to deter the uncertainty in the East, and provide for the
emerging threats from the South.
It is unlikely that a joint multi-national European nuclear force will
develop in the near term, although recent statements by French leaders have
alluded to such a concept. Neither the French nor the British have been very
enthusiastic about sharing nuclear control with non-nuclear states. Moreover, the
Germans may not comfortably sacrifice their American deterrent protection for
a less capable and less reliable European substitute. Fiscal constraints may
encourage the United Kingdom and France to bridge their differences and
cooperate on joint development of the long-range air-launched stand-off missile.
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French leaders are faced with a disgruntled electorate that recently
voiced disapproval of the status quo. They will face pressure to reorder priorities
and improve the nation's economic condition at the expense of the military. It is
nonetheless unlikely that the nuclear deterrent will experience any substantial
modifications. As remarked by a Gaullist member of the National Assembly,
If our country plays a preeminent role in determining Europe's future, is
one of the United Nations Security Council's five permanent members,
exercises a major influence on part of Africa and has the ambition to play
a role in the Middle East, it is neither because of its industrial strength, its
financial resources or its cultural rayonnement (...), but because of its
independent defence policy and the possession of nuclear weapons. 100
D. GERMAN PERSPECTIVES
The Federal Republic has had mixed feelings about the nuclear deterrents
of both the United Kingdom and France. In one respect these forces have
contributed to the security of Western Europe. Nevertheless, the Federal
Republic's conventional force responsibilities may have been increased by the
diverted resources required to complete and modernize the French and British
nuclear deterrents.
This section surveys German perspectives on the nuclear forces of these two
countries. It begins with German impressions of the British forces, followed by
150lFranqois Fillon, "Francois Mitterrand a degage en touche," he Monde, 26 May
1989; cited in Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, French Strategic Options in the 1990s, Adelphi
Paper no. 260 (London: International Institute of International Studies, 1991), 15.
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the French forces. The section concludes with an overview of the role of these
European nuclear forces in the security of the Federal Republic.
1. The United Kingdom
According to Lawrence Freedman, "In bilateral Anglo-German relations,
questions of nuclear policy have not acquired the importance that they have in
the relations between Britain and France, and between France and Germany." 151
The specifics or extent of the nuclear relationship between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the United Kingdom are rarely delineated in public sources.
Neither country publicly proclaims the existence of the relationship. This
ambiguity stems from the reluctance of the British to commit themselves to a
specific guarantee, and German reluctance to rely on a British guarantee.
The Germans are reluctant to rely on the British for several reasons.
British animosities linger from Germany's checkered past. Germans are aware of
these feelings and are therefore probably less inclined to value a security
guarantee from the United Kingdom.
Some Germans minimize the value of an extended deterrent from a
small nuclear power. As Christoph Bertram argues,
Britain will never decide to launch a strategic attack on the Soviet Union
because her Allies want it but only because she feels that her own, ultimate
security cannot be safeguarded in any other way. NATO rules cannot
151Freedman, 185.
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change what is, after all, the elementary rule of nuclear military power: it
is a political, not a military decision, and it is one vou take only for yourself,
not on behalf of another power because its consequences concern your own
very survival. 152
2. France
The Germans have shown much more interest in the nuclear policy of
the French than in that of the British. The Federal Republic has had little
influence in French nuclear planning due to France's withdrawal from NATO's
integrated military command. The realization that certain French short range
nuclear weapons might be targeted on German soil raised concerns.
These concerns were alleviated somewhat with an unprecedented
decision on consultation announced by President Mitterrand on 28 February 1986.
Within the limits imposed by the extreme rapidity of such decisions, the
President of the Republic declares himself disposed to consult the
Chancellor of the FRG on the possible employment of prestrategic French
weapons on German territory. He notes that the decision cannot be shared
in this matter. The President of the Republic indicates that he has decided,
with the Chancellor of the FRG, to equip himself with technical means for
immediate and reliable consultation in times of crisis. 153
This announcement marked the end of over two decades of refusing to consult
or cooperate with the Federal Republic in the area of nuclear weapons policy.
152/Christoph Bertram, "Britain's Nuclear Weapons and West German Security/'
in British-German Defence Cooperation: Partners within the Alliance, eds. Karl Kaiser
and John Roper (London: Jane's, 1988), 203.
153Le Monde, 2-3 March 1986, 4; cited in David S. Yost, "Franco-German
Defence Cooperation," in Stephen F. Szabo, ed., The Bundeszuehr and Western
Security (London: Macmillan, 1990), 223.
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Some West Germans reacted to the consultation promise as a measure
long overdue and called for further cooperation. As David Yost explains,
In their view, the Federal Republic has been indirectly helping to pay the
bill for French nuclear forces by shouldering so much of the conventional
burden in Western Europe, and France should accept a West German right
to have some say regarding French military investments, nuclear and non-
nuclear. 1 "4
German experts want to ensure that French nuclear policy is coordinated with
NATO policy and is not simply "a nuclear counteroffensive on German soil." 133
Some German experts have discerned value in the French nuclear force
as a foundation for greater West European autonomy in defence in the future.
As Peter Stratmann has noted:
It is important to prevent the USSR from becoming the sole nuclear power
in Europe. The material prerequisites for developing a sufficient politico-
strategic counterweight in Western Europe must be preserved in order to
obviate potential difficulties that could result from a total dependence on the
American readiness to maintain extended strategic deterrence in the long
run . . . [Statements by [some] conservative voices in the Federal Republic
appear short-sighted in seeing advantage in building strategic missile
defence systems such that the French 'force de dissuasion/ the most visible
symbol of the Gaullist pretence of independence and status discrimination
over the neighbour across the Rhine, would become obsolete. 156
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Several Germans such as Egon Bahr, Helmut Schmidt and Alfred
Dregger have called for an explicit French nuclear guarantee. 107 Former State
Secretary of Defense Lothar Ruhl has said that Bonn would welcome it "if the
French nuclear forces were to extend their protection to include the Federal
Republic, in addition to the protection offered by the American nuclear forces and
NATO's own nuclear weapons in Europe. However, only as an addition, not as
an alternative." 158 In 1985, then-Defense Minister Manfred Worner echoed these
views, noting, "France's nuclear capability is insufficient to protect the Federal
Republic. We will have to continue to rely on the American nuclear
umbrella." 159
A closer security relationship between France and Germany that
includes reliance on French nuclear weapons is probably still many years away.
Using the "Eurocorps", the October 1991 Kohl-Mitterrand initiative on a European
army, the Germans will attempt to draw the French closer to NATO's integrated
military structure. These closer relations are intended to set the foundation for
157For Bahr, see Der Spiegel 20 May 1985, pp. 126-127; for Schmidt, Deutscher
Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, Plenarprotokoll 10/77, 28 June 1984, pp.5596-
5603; for Dregger, Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, 19 June 1987, 2; cited in Yost,
"Franco-German," 241.
158Ruhl cited in DPA dispatch of 4 October 1985 in FBIS-Western Europe, 8
October 1985, p. J4; cited in Yost, "Franco-German," 241.
159W6rner interview in International Defense Review, vol. 18, no. 9, 1985, 1393;
cited in Yost, "Franco-German," 241.
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future advancements, but many Germans continue to consider French policy still
"committed to national ends." 160 It will be some time before a majority of
Germans would consider nuclear cooperation with the French as a viable
alternative. Recent interview sources suggest that Helmut Schmidt's judgements
in 1987 remain valid today:
The politicians in France ought to know that the Germans have a picture of
France's security policy that implies the belief that in the case of war the
French neighbour would participate in defence only when it had already
become clear that the fight on the territory east of France had been lost. In
other words, the Germans believe that the French would only join in the
battle for Europe when it would already be too late. It must be understood
on the French side that this is the German view, whether right or wrong.
This is a dangerous picture, because it makes the Germans believe that
France would not be a fully reliable partner in the case of war. 161
E. CONCLUSION
The stockpile reduction agreements of the United States and the former
Soviet Union will increase the relative numerical importance of the nuclear
weapons of the United Kingdom and France. Whether both of these countries can
maintain their most important modernization plans in the face of inevitable
reductions remains to be seen. Both countries made noteworthy nuclear force
reductions in 1992, mainly in non-strategic systems.
160Yost, "Franco-German," 243.
161Helmut Schmidt, "Deutsch-franzosiche Zusammenarbeit in der
Sicherheitspolitik," Europa-Archiv, vol. 42, 10 June 1987, 311; cited in Yost, "Franco-
German," 243.
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Cooperation between the United Kingdom and France with respect to
nuclear weapons policy is possible. Funding constraints may even make
cooperation a necessity. Further development of this cooperation into some form
of European deterrent is nonetheless probably years away. Neither country is
currently disposed to sacrifice its national autonomy to develop a European
nuclear deterrent.
Germany's perspective on France and the United Kingdom and their nuclear
forces is subdued. For the most part, Germans do not consider either country
capable of providing a viable nuclear umbrella to the Federal Republic. From a
German perspective, the forces of these countries "do not provide deterrence
beyond the narrowest definition of British and French national security." 162
The Federal Republic will continue to remain wary of a European deterrent
until integration has reached a point where the French and the British consider
German territory a part of their common home; this idea is many years away. As
long as the Federal Republic can rely on the nuclear guarantee provided by the
United States, Germans will prefer to remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Whether the Germans can count on the continued viability of the American
guarantee is the subject of the next chapter.
162Bertram, 209.
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IV. GERMAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Republic and the United States have been joined in a mutually
beneficial security partnership for over forty years. The Federal Republic
achieved unification and prosperity under the security umbrella of the United
States and NATO. The United States and the Federal Republic worked together,
with their NATO allies, to contain Soviet expansion. The removal of the primary
stimulus for this close relationship, owing to the collapse of the USSR, is certain
to promote changes in transatlantic relations.
This chapter focuses on German perceptions of the continued validity of the
American nuclear guarantee. To reach informed judgements about the future of
this guarantee the chapter begins with a survey of the United States commitment
to Europe since the end of the second world war. There is a direct correlation
between the American commitment to Europe, often superficially and
symbolically reckoned in terms of the number of troops deployed, and the
validity of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. It is often argued that as long as there are
U.S. troops in Germany, the United States is committed to use all means available,
including nuclear weapons, to ensure their defense. The chapter continues with
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German perspectives on this commitment and concludes with judgments about
the future of the American nuclear guarantee to Germany.
B. BACKGROUND OF A COMMITMENT
George Washington set the tone for American policy towards Europe with
his farewell address in 1796, "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign
nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little
political connection as possible." The decision to negotiate the North Atlantic
Treaty is often taken for granted. Establishing an "entangling alliance" with
Europe was, however, a revolution in American diplomacy.
Abstention from European political and military entanglements had been the
hallmark of American diplomatic history. It was formulated in
Washington's farewell address in 1796, confirmed in Jefferson's inaugural
address in 1801, and codified in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. 163
When the United States first started working towards the recovery of Europe
in the late 1940s, there was no intention of military deployments. The Marshall
Plan of 1947 was based on the principle of self-help and self-reliance. It was not
until 1948 that American policy makers determined that to ensure European
163Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States (Boston: Twayne
Publishers, 1988), 1.
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recovery, the United States would have to underwrite Western European
security. 1 "4
The first step towards acknowledging this security requirement was the
Vandenburg Resolution of June 1948. This resolution legitimized the idea of a
formal security arrangement with Western Europe while emphasizing self-help
and mutual aid.
The next step was the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty. There were
reservations about the commitment required by the Treaty. Congress was willing
to commit equipment but no troops, and was concerned about potentially
sacrificing its power to declare war. The Senate supported the idea that the treaty
was a natural outgrowth of the Marshall Plan. The treaty sent a signal to the
Soviet Union that America was committed to Europe's defense based on self-
help. 165 The United States approved the North Atlantic Treaty on 21 July 1949.
Nevertheless, there were reservations about the military obligations incurred in
the treaty that would later hamper its implementation.
These reservations were voiced during the floor debate of the Military
Assistance Program (MAP). "Both the Truman Administration and the European
allies believed that the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty would only be





achieved if accompanied by a programme for military assistance (MAP) to
Western Europe." 166 The administration maneuvered the bill through Congress
with difficulty. The executive battled members reluctant to commit large force
levels to Europe. Moreover, the administration was experiencing a decay of its
bi-partisan support for foreign policy as the Republicans were blaming the
administration for the fall of China in October 1949.
The administration struggled to define its European policy while it was
losing credibility with its policy in Asia. Within the State Department the
European security policy was receiving new emphasis:
The fall of China and the Soviet atomic explosion . . . provoked a reappraisal
of American security problems . . . and an important segment of opinion
within the State Department had concluded not only that the military danger
from the Soviet Union was significant but that it would become more so: as
Soviet atomic developments eroded the United States advantage thereby
neutralising or nullifying the deterrent effect of American atomic weapons,
Soviet conventional aggression could be anticipated. 167
The pace of rearmament in Europe and the United States needed to increase.
The North Korean attack against South Korea on 25 June 1950 initiated this
change and the administration decided to send U.S. troops to Europe. There was







The elaborate NATO framework with its numerous subsidiary units, now
appeared an empty shell incapable of repelling a sudden attack of any
magnitude. What was worse, the allies lost confidence for the moment in
NATO's ability to prevent such an attack from occurring. What had
happened in the Far East could happen in Europe. 1 68
The next step in solidifying the security arrangement with the Europeans
had been decided. However, some congressmen were more concerned about the
threat to the American economy than the threat to Atlantic security. 169 There
was no question that the decision to send U.S. troops to Europe would be
expensive.
In 1951 a major debate in Congress determined the outcome. Senator Taft
defined the key issues of the debate. The first of these issues was burden-sharing.
What kind of military contribution was the United States intending to make
to Atlantic defence? How did this compare with European efforts? Was the
distribution of effort an equitable one? Indeed, was the United States to
play a major or merely supporting role in providing for European
security? 170
A second theme concerned strategic military planning. It involved the
future scope of defense spending and how funds would be allocated between the
168Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military
Assistance Program, 1948-1951 (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense,





services. It included the debate on whether the U.S. should rely on air power or
ground forces. 171
When Congress decided to support the administration's decision to commit
troops to Europe, America once again diverged from its isolationist tendency in
the past.
For a nation that had always been reluctant to support a standing army, and
had traditionally relied upon wartime mobilization rather than peacetime
preparedness, the decision to send U.S. troops to Europe was momentous—
as great a departure from the past precepts of American military policy as
the North Atlantic Treaty had been from the orthodoxies of American
diplomacy. 172
America was making commitments that implied large defense budgets for the
foreseeable future.
President Eisenhower responded to these economic concerns with the "New
Look" in 1954. With an emphasis on "massive retaliation" this new policy was
designed to save money. It would balance the overwhelming conventional forces
of the Soviet Union with strategic nuclear air power, reducing the need for the
costly U.S. conventional buildup. The plan was never taken to its logical
171The tone for this debate was provided by former President Hoover, who
proposed a greater reliance on air and naval power. The essence of this argument
was to achieve containment by controlling the oceans while forward-based (in
Japan and Great Britain) strategic air power deterred aggression from Soviet




conclusion by significantly reducing European troop levels, but nevertheless some
members of Congress continued to challenge these overseas commitments.
Senator Mike Mansfield, a Democrat from Montana, emerged as the leading
critic of the executive's European troop policy. Mansfield continually fought
foreign troop commitments in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The sentiment that
Mansfield represented was a common theme in congressional criticism of the
European commitment. There was a perception that the Europeans were not
contributing adequately to their own defense. European economic recovery was
extremely successful while America faced continual balance of payment deficits.
The mood of many Americans indicated that it was time for the Europeans to pay
for a greater portion of their own defense.
Senator Mansfield justified a troop withdrawal as a reaction to the new
international security environment. Mansfield believed that the conventional
inferiority of allied forces in Europe made the role of the U.S. forces that of a
nuclear "trip wire." The launch of Sputnik in 1957 had highlighted American
vulnerability to nuclear retaliation and the importance of a visible U.S.
commitment to European security. Mansfield felt that this U.S. deployment could
be substantially reduced without affecting its primary role as a "trip wire."
Mansfield received support for his initiatives from various related interests.
Different senators had different concerns: for some . . . the key issue was the
fiscal dimension and especially the balance of payments problem; for others
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it was the need to encourage greater burden-sharing by the Europeans; for
yet others it was a way of expressing resentment against either European
trade and agricultural practices or a lack of support for Vietnam. 173
Mansfield's ideas contrasted sharply with the more flexible doctrine
emphasized by the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s. The Kennedy
administration was attempting to distance itself from the constraints of massive
retaliation and the concept of U.S. forces serving as a trip wire. According to
Wolfram Hanrieder,
In broad terms, the new strategy implied that the United States would not
use nuclear weapons at the outset of hostilities except in reply to a nuclear
attack, that small-scale attacks would not elicit a nuclear response at all, and
that even in case of a massive attack NATO would initially respond only
with conventional forces to allow time for negotiations with the opponent
and consultations among the allies about the initial use of nuclear
weapons. 174
Flexible response did not allow for the troop reductions proposed by Mansfield.
On the contrary, flexible response reduced the U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons
and shifted emphasis to a conventional buildup.
By the early 1970s pressure against U.S. troops in Europe had peaked. The
executive and Congress both addressed the anti-European sentiment by
connecting security and economics. The reduction in American economic
173
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174Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German
Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 71.
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predominance in the 1970s made European economic integration a less attractive
prospect in the eyes of some Americans. This concern was voiced in the Senate:
The development of the Common Market and its policies . . . cannot be
considered separately from the NATO and military aspects of the American
presence in Europe. The notion of interdependence so articulately drawn by
the Europeans and the Executive Branch on the issue of NATO should be
applied to the economic and trade relationships between us. And
conversely, if Europeans do not accept a relationship of interdependence
economically, then we should not accept the heavy burden that imposes
upon the U.S. by the heavy commitment of men in Europe. 175
Nonetheless, the administration defeated the Mansfield Amendment of 1973,
which called for drastic reductions in European force levels. The administration
used two traditional arguments: the fear of an unraveling Atlantic alliance, and
the risk of hampering mutual force reduction negotiations. The administration
also discredited the balance of payments argument, providing statistics that
pointed out that the American-European military deficit was comparable to the
American-European tourism deficit. 176 Secretary of Defense Laird discredited
the burden-sharing argument by pointing out that "Most of the deployed forces
175Memorandum to Senator Mansfield from Charles D. Ferris, December 28,
1972 regarding Trip to Europe, Fall 1972 (Majority Leader Files, Mansfield
Collection, University of Montana, Missoula), 4; quoted in Williams, 206.
176Williams, 218.
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are supplied by our allies—something on the order of 90 per cent of the ground
forces, 80 per cent of the ships, and 75 per cent of the aircraft." 177
The administration alone could not quell the rising tide of pressure against
U.S. troops in Europe in 1974. It was developments in international and domestic
politics that combined to reduce the pressure. The Yom Kippur War of October
1973 created renewed tensions with both the Soviet Union and the European
allies. Detente was replaced by a more critical stance towards the Soviet Union
that made discussion of a troop withdrawal unpopular.
The congressional pressure against U.S. troops in Europe has yet to reach
the intensity of the Mansfield era or that of the "Great Debate" of 1951.
Nevertheless, beginning in the early 1980s a pervasive interest in burden-sharing
has dominated the troop question in Congress. This issue is not new to the
debate, but it gained more prominence after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979. There was concern that the allies reacted less vigorously to the invasion
than some Americans would have liked.
Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska responded to this perceived trend by
attempting to place a cap on U.S. forces in Europe in 1982. During the 1979-1983
INF debate discussed in chapter two, some congressmen threatened to withdraw
l77Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and
Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third
Congress, First Session on U.S. Forces in Europe, 25 July 1973 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1973), 14; quoted in Williams, 218.
100
troops from Europe if the West Europeans did not agree to deployment. The "no
nukes-no troops" threat was an offshoot from the familiar theme of burden-
sharing. In essence congressional leaders were insisting on nuclear "risk-sharing."
Senator Nunn initiated an amendment in 1984 to tie U.S. troop levels in Europe
to agreed increases in European defense budgets. Dwindling defense budgets
and ballooning trade and national budget deficits continue to motivate
congressional concerns about equitable burden-sharing.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the revolution in eastern Europe
have stimulated a reappraisal of the European security framework. The 1990-1991
Gulf War brought the issue to the forefront as many legislators were concerned
that the allies would not contribute their share. Countries such as Germany were
under scrutiny due to their minimal force commitment.
Recent congressional debates reflect this burden-sharing concern. Patricia
Schroeder, the Colorado Democrat who chairs the House Armed Services
Committee Defense Burdensharing Panel, in 1991 championed an advisory
amendment to reduce the U.S. forces in Europe to 100,000 by 1995. A similar
measure by Senator Kent Conrad was successful, indicating a looming challenge
to the executive.
For more than a decade, resentment had festered on Capitol Hill over the
belief that the United States has shouldered far too much of the cost of
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collective defense, permitting economic dynamos such as Japan and
Germany to pour money instead into extending their competitive edge. 178
The future of President Bush's proposal to retain 150,000 U.S. troops in
Europe is questioned by many lawmakers. The situation is exacerbated by the
stalemate on European farm subsidies in the current General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. In a recent security conference in Munich,
Senator Richard Lugar, R-Ind, stated:
I don't think the Europeans understand how far they have to move on trade.
If they don't back down, it could undermine NATO and American
participation in the alliance. We're heading to a precipice that Europeans
really don't understand. 179
In the middle of a deep recession and large defense budget cuts, the U.S.
commitment to European security is difficult to sell. Senator John McCain, R-
Ariz., made the point in concrete terms: "A politician finds it very difficult, when
Williams Air Force Base in Arizona is being closed, to explain the rationale for
keeping bases overseas." 180 The defense budget cuts will stimulate arguments
for drawing U.S. forces away from Europe, on the grounds that the Europeans
can handle their own defense.
178Pat Towell, "Debating How to Share the Burden." Congressional Quarterly,
May 25, 1991, 1385.
179Lugar cited in Marc Fisher, "U.S. Officials Take Tough New Line On
Europe," The International Herald Tribune, 10 February 1992.
180McCain cited in Pat Towell, "Bush's Europe Troop Plan Faces Some Paring,
Lawmakers Say," Congressional Quarterly, 15 February 1992, 360.
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The debate on maintaining U.S. troops in Europe has remained remarkably
consistent over the years. The central issue has remained burden-sharing.
Connections are made between trade and security, and an indefinite European
reliance on U.S. security assistance. The domestic U.S. economic issue has
remained pervasive throughout the decades. Lawmakers concerned about the
cost of maintaining a large military have continually challenged foreign troop
deployments in search of a peace dividend.
C. GERMAN PERSPECTIVES
In the opinion of some Germans, at times the United States has been
inconsistent and almost indifferent with respect to the security of the Federal
Republic. Nevertheless, the relationship has remained solid; and Germans realize,
although they may not openly express it, that they have prospered under the
United States security umbrella.
With respect to the nuclear guarantee, chapter two depicts the history of this
relationship and German concerns throughout. According to Robert Blackwill,
Each change in NATO nuclear doctrine from Massive Retaliation in the early
1950s to Flexible Response in 1967 to Last Resort in 1990 provoked the
greatest possible scrutiny and often anxiety from Bonn, lest the change mean
that the United States did not intend credibly to threaten nuclear use, thus
weakening deterrence, or conversely that Washington really did intend to
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employ these awful weapons early, recklessly, and massively on German
territory in the event of a conflict. 181
This section concentrates on German perspectives in the new security
environment. It concentrates on German views of the German-American security
partnership since November 1989. These perspectives have their origins in the
evolution of the U.S. commitment to Europe and German policy reactions to the
American initiatives discussed in chapter two. The opinions are naturally
influenced by the dynamics of the relationship between the two countries in all
fields.
1. Political and Economic Relations
German perspectives on political relations with the United States have
been mixed. In one respect, feelings have been quite positive. According to
Gebhard Schweigler, "the role played by the United States in the destruction of
the Wall and the subsequent reunification of Germany has left both sides with
good feelings toward each other—feelings of achievement, pride, gratitude, and
commitment." 182 Nonetheless, some of the lingering feelings from the
reunification process are more negative. Some Germans remain embarrassed that
181Robert D. Blackwill, "Patterns of Partnership: The U.S.-German Security
Relationship in the 1990s," in From Occupation to Cooperation: The United States and
United Germany in a Changing World Order, Steven Muller and Gebhard
Schweigler, eds. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 136.
182Gebhard Schweigler, "Problems and Prospects for Partners in Leadership,"
in From Occupation, Muller and Schweigler, 244.
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U.S. encouragement played such a large part in persuading reluctant Germans to
risk reunification. 183
Criticism also stems from the perception that the United States is in decline.
As the post-Cold War era begins, the United States is weakened in the areas
which will be required for many future security problems in Central and Eastern
Europe: economic links, political influence, and financial resources. 184 According
to Gebhard Schweigler,
Especially among Germany's intellectual elite, reports about the United
States' allegedly imminent decline as a superpower probably meet as much
with a certain degree of Schadenfreude (pleasure at bad news) as with
concern over the difficulties faced by Germany's most important ally. That
glee over America's decline rests on a rejection of the United States as a role
model, which in turn tends to question the relevance of the United States as
an ally and partner. 185
A recently reported leak of a preliminary draft of a Defense Planning
Guidance document provided another example of problems in U.S.-German
relations. The document implied that Germany might someday seek to become
a nuclear power. German government spokesman Dieter Vogel responded to this
183Schweigler, 226.




leak stating, "This scenario that Germany could one day in the future have its
own nuclear weapons is not, absolutely not, justified." 186
There is no domestic support for acquiring a national nuclear deterrent
in the Federal Republic. According to John Van Oudenaren, "Nuclear weapons
are not seen as desirable for a Germany that has so convincingly demonstrated
both its economic and moral superiority." 187 Casual assessments by American
security analysts suggesting the inevitable nature of a German national nuclear
deterrent only complicate the future relationship between the two countries.
Economic issues have played a dominant role in the relations between
these two countries, as highlighted in earlier parts of this chapter. As economic
problems mount in the United States, pressure on the Federal Republic will
increase to achieve concessions on GATT. The security relationship is always
implicitly linked to economic ties. According to Ronald Asmus, "It would be a
tremendous irony if the effort to reshape the transatlantic security link were to be
186
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undercut by the inability to forge a new and compatible set of transatlantic
economic relationships. " 188
2. The New Transatlantic Security Relationship
The nature of the new transatlantic security relationship will depend
greatly on the political and economic relationship discussed above. This new
security relationship will provide a framework for the role of nuclear deterrence
in the defense policy of the Federal Republic. The first step in developing this
framework is determining the role of the United States in future European
defense arrangements.
a. European Defense Identity
Germany's views on a new Western European defense identity are
divided between a NATO-based proposal and a more autonomous European
defense proposal. The NATO proposition entails a greater American influence
within a structure of proven effectiveness which has been successful for over
forty years. The alternative systems, based on either the European Community
(EC) and the Western European Union (WEU) or on the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), would have less American influence and
currently lack a tested institutional infrastructure in defense matters.
188Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany and America: Partners in Leadership?" Survival
vol. 33, no. 6 (November/December 1991): 550.
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The German government has attempted to maintain its links with
the United States while moving forward in the area of European integration. It
has achieved this by remaining committed to NATO while pursuing more
independent European defense proposals. Germany's multi-faceted approach was
demonstrated with two recent events.
On 2 October 1991, "German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher and US Secretary of State James Baker III suggested establishment of a
'North Atlantic Cooperation Council.'" 189 This proposal was designed to
develop a liaison between the Eastern European nations, including the successor
states of the former Soviet Union, and NATO. It served mainly as a cautious
move to postpone dealing with requests by the Eastern European nations to be
included in the NATO security guarantee. For Germany it symbolized a
continued commitment to use NATO as a vehicle for future European security
needs.
Two weeks later, on 14 October 1991, Germany and France called
for the "creation of a corps-strength Western European army as a step toward
giving the region an independent defense capability." 190 This implied a German
189
Peter Grier, "Eastern Europeans Wary of Neighborhood Conflicts," The
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190Alan Riding, "Mitterrand Joins Kohl in Proposing a European Army," New
York Times, 17 October 1991, A7.
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move towards the French position favoring an independent European defense
force. A German official in the Ministry of Defense highlighted this conflict: "We
cannot sit on the fence forever, because in the long term there will be a conflict
between our desire for a European defense identity and our belief in a strong
Atlantic alliance." 191
The government's security model encompasses the integration of
Europe while maintaining the nuclear security guarantee of the United States. To
maintain a continued American nuclear umbrella for Europe the governing
coalition continues to emphasize a role for NATO in a future European security
structure. Their concept of this role states:
As far as NATO is concerned, it will have to change "its nature and
structure" adaptive to a unifying Europe: "Already today a shift is evident
in NATO away from dominance by the United States toward an alliance of
two partners of equal weight." Still, the Alliance "will have to assure to the
Europeans, also in the future, the nuclear protection of the United
States."
192
The SPD envisages a more temporary role for NATO and
concentrates its security structure plans on the CSCE. In line with the party's
principle of "common security" the SPD manifesto declares:
The objective of all these steps is the creation of a European Security System
into which the alliances merge, in which isolated national actions are
191m
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impossible and in which the armed forces of the participating nations are
involved. 193
The temporary role assigned to NATO is designed to allow the
CSCE/ European Security System to develop "conflict control mechanisms":
On the path towards a European Security System it will be necessary for the
Soviet Union and NATO to change their military strategies and doctrines
and to adjust to the new actualities in Europe. Whilst retaining their
defensive capability it will be necessary for the armed forces of both sides
to become on the one hand incapable of attack and on the other to become
capable of transbloc cooperation. 194
The SPD proposes a security structure that is European-based,
separated from the "dominance" of the United States and NATO. The current
CDU/CSU-FDP government wants to remain closely connected with the United
States, although it is also interested in a more autonomous approach to Western
European defense identity. The recent announcement by France and Germany
concerning the establishment of a European corps is a step in this direction. The
German government has offered assurances that this force will work within the
framework of NATO, although it is still perceived as a move towards a more
European defense identity.
193
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Critics of this European defense identity consider it to be hasty and
ill-conceived. In their opinion it lacks an organization to control it, an
infrastructure to meet logistical and lift requirements, and a
reconnaissance/ tactical anti-missile defense capacity. 195 Most of these
requirements have historically been provided by the United States or NATO.
According to Hans Riihle,
The desire felt by many Western Europeans to Europeanise security policy
and to arrive at a short-term fait accompli is here again seen to be due more
to a generally felt need for greater detachment from the Americans than to
any clear situation or of true progress toward European integration. The
WEU's rapid reaction force is increasingly seen to be what it always was: a
figment of political imagination, not properly thought out in terms of
requirements, costs and consequences, doing more political damage than
military good—a hare-brained strategic notion. 196
Other critics of this trend are concerned that the Europeans may
be marginalizing the U.S. security role in Europe. These critics highlight the
American role in balancing nationalistic tendencies in Europe. According to
Josef Joffe,
By sparing the West Europeans the necessity of autonomous choice in
matters of defense, the United States removed the systemic cause of conflict
that had underlain so many of Europe's past wars. (World War I is perhaps
the best example.) By protecting Western Europe against others, the United
195Hans Riihle, "European Alternative to NATO Force is Still 'A Hare-brained
Strategic Notion/" Die Zeit, 26 September 1991; published in The German Tribune,




States also protected the half-continent against itself. And by paving the
way from international anarchy to security community the United States not
only defused ancient rivalries but also built the indispensable foundation for
future cooperation. 197
Hans-Dietrich Genscher echoed these ideas more recently,
German-American Friendship and European-American friendship belong to
the constants in German foreign policy. . . . From the beginning [the Western
alliance] was more than a reaction to the expansionist policy of the Soviet
Union after the Second World War. The truth is that by creating this
alliance we have drawn the lesson from the mistakes made after the First
World War. It is for this reason that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact does
not affect the Western alliance. 198
This pacifying argument is often difficult to articulate, because it
implies doubts about the peaceful nature of nations, including the Federal
Republic of Germany. As Gerhard Schweigler has observed, "Western European
nations will not readily admit that they cannot yet be trusted to live in peace with
each other." 199
b. The Nuclear Debate
The nuclear debate in the Federal Republic has periodically been
one of the most important and controversial security challenges of the day.
Throughout its history the Federal Republic has relied on the U.S. nuclear
197]osef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign Policy no. 54 (Spring 1984):
68-69.
198Genscher, Das Parlament, no. 13, 22 March 1991, 12; cited in Asmus,
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199Schweigler, 228.
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guarantee. Therefore the nuclear debate is in essence a debate on the future of
the U.S. commitment.
"The German attitude toward nuclear deterrence ... is as
inconclusive as it is crucial."200 This ambivalence stems from both widespread
public ignorance about strategic affairs and Germany's precarious geopolitical
position. The primary focus of contention between the dominant political forces
is whether Europe should be denuclearized.
The government presently supports continued reliance on nuclear
weapons in the context of Rueckversicherung ("reinsurance"). 201 The concept is
designed to maintain a U.S. guarantee as a hedge against a reversal of the recent
positive trends in Europe. According to the Inspector-General of the Bundeswehr,
Major General Klaus Naumann:
We are a non-nuclear state and will remain one as a unified Germany. We
live in a neighborhood of nuclear nations, which will remain in that status.
One of them is the Soviet Union. And one justification—especially for us
Germans—for continuing to rely on nuclear protection is that we must
continue to live in the nuclear shadow of the Soviet Union. Therefore a
means must be found whereby a non-nuclear weapons state like Germany
200Thomas Enders, Holger H. Mey, and Michael Riihle, "The New Germany
and Nuclear Weapons," in Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from
Europe, Asia, and North America, eds. Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A Maaranen
(New York: Plenum Press, 1992), 127.
201National Security Research, 33.
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is protected against Soviet use of nuclear weapons. We can realize that only
through alliance with a nuclear power.202
German government circles look to the United States for this
nuclear protection, although it is not quite clear how this deterrent will be
exercised. The government calls for the continued presence of American nuclear
arms on German soil. The justification for this position is the concept of "risk-
sharing." According to General Naumann:
When we enter into an alliance with a nuclear power for the purpose of
war-prevention—and there can be no other purpose—then that means a
readiness for the reciprocal sharing of risks, because one cannot ask a
nuclear power to assume alone, in the event of conflict, the truly "last"
decision and thereby the total risk. We will thus always be confronted with
the question: How can we share the nuclear risk? One way, which we took
in the past, was the readiness to station nuclear weapons on our territory as
a visible expression of risk-sharing. In what form, in what quantity and in
what time-frame that is to be done (in the future) is something to be
discussed in the Alliance and in the domestic political debate. ... I believe
that, in pursuit of a concept of mutual security, this is also a question that
we will have to discuss with all openness with the Soviet Union.203
The new European security environment has made risk-sharing
easier in some respects for the Germans. According to Rudiger Moniac,
For Germany, the new atomic age will entail much less of a psychological
and political burden, not to mention the fact that the use of nuclear weapons
on German soil can already be considered utterly inconceivable. Even so,
202
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Germany must shoulder its share of the nuclear risk within NATO if it is to
continue to be accepted as an equal partner.204
Nonetheless, recent trends have complicated the maintenance of an
American nuclear presence in Germany. "The 'last resort' emphasis proclaimed
at the NATO London summit in 1990 has been interpreted in German circles as
signifying, in effect, a return by the United States to a doctrine of 'massive
retaliation/"205
According to General Naumann,
A modified NATO will continue to need nuclear weapons in order to
balance the Soviet nuclear capability and to maintain the element of
uncertainty in the risk calculation of any adversary—to make it impossible
for an enemy to plan and wage a war at a calculable risk. Nuclear strategy
will reflect the idea of last resort. This might eventually result in a concept
of mutually-accepted minimum deterrence, and it will definitely result in a
dramatic reduction of nuclear weapons deployed in and around Europe.206
The perceived return to a doctrine of "massive retaliation"
contradicts the conservative emphasis on "risk-sharing." As the U.S. weapons
continue to be removed from the European continent, a gradual "de-coupling" is
perceived on the part of some German conservatives. Without a viable Europe-
204Rudiger Moniac, "NATO Revises Nuclear Strategy for the Post-Cold War
Age," Die Welt, 22 October 1992; in The German Tribune, Hamburg, 30 October
1992, No. 1538, pp. 1-2.
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based nuclear weapons force, there is a fear among some Germans that United
States "extended deterrence" will lose its validity. These fears were undoubtedly
influential in ensuring that the phrase "last resort" did not appear in NATO's
November 1991 strategic concept. German conservatives point out that "the
gradual weakening of the concept of extended deterrence began years before the
fundamental changes in East-West relations."207 They blame the deterioration
on the United States decision to eliminate INF, the continued anti-nuclear rhetoric
of recent American presidents, and the German reluctance to implement nuclear
modernization. 208 As stated by Pierre Lellouche: "In Europe itself the logic of
nuclear weapons deployment was fatally wounded by the signing in 1987 of the
INF treaty."209
The reduction of U.S. nuclear arms in Europe was accelerated by
the October 1991 announcement by NATO that it will remove from Europe half
of its stockpile of nuclear bombs intended for aircraft use. "Within two or three
years, the alliance will have only 700 nuclear warheads in Europe, about one-
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tenth of the number deployed in 1967."210 President Bush's 27 September 1991
announcement began a chain of events that "removed most, but not all, of the
immediate bilateral nuclear substance from the U.S.-German security
relationship." 211
The German conservatives want to prevent the complete removal
of U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany. From their perspective,
The removal of the U.S. nuclear presence from Europe would imply what
some have called 'existential' or 'declaratory' extended deterrence-that is,
U.S. nuclear guarantees without the nuclear presence that has historically
been seen by many experts and officials as necessary for the credibility of
U.S. nuclear commitments.212
As trends appear to favor movement towards a nuclear weapons-
free Germany, conservative skeptics highlight Germany's vulnerable position:
A strategy of deterrence only, which sidesteps the issue of a coherent
employment policy in favor of some vague notions of existential deterrence,
or which envisages nuclear use only in the context of large-scale strategic
retaliatory strikes, cannot be in Germany's security interest. Such a strategy
would not only require an entirely unrealistic and undesirable degree of U.S.
self-commitment, but would also narrow the range of U.S. military and,
hence, political freedom of action in a way which is incompatible with
maintaining alliances worldwide. Ultimately, to maintain the credibility of
such a concept would require the United States to create an image of being
210Alan Riding, "NATO Will Cut Atom Weapons for Aircraft Use," New York
Times, 18 October 1991, Al.
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able to act irrationally. Such a strategy of calculated irrationality, however,
is not only questionable with respect to its ability to gain domestic and
alliance support, it furthermore never has been able to satisfy responsible
decision-makers (who, after all, could one day be confronted with the choice
of suicide of surrender). Selective and limited strategic options may solve
part of the problem; however, they cannot fulfill the important criteria of
visibility and, thus, demonstrated credibility of the U.S. engagement.213
The dividing argument between the governing CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition and the opposition Social Democrats centers on this issue of whether the
presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany is a requirement for the sustained
security and freedom of the Federal Republic. The "risk-sharing" concept retains
that link between the non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe and the strategic
arsenal of the United States. A return to the concept of "massive retaliation"
would represent a move towards sole reliance on the strategic arsenal of the
United States. The NATO decision to continue to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons
in Europe and to postpone a decision on the production of an air-launched missile
has steered the nuclear security argument in the direction of the SPD.
The SPD proposes a nuclear weapons-free zone in Central Europe.
The Social Democrats call on NATO to "abandon forward defense, flexible
response, and nuclear-first-use doctrines and renounce nuclear modernization
213Enders, Mey, and Riihle, pp. 134-135.
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plans (notably Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles or TASM)." 214 The SPD doubts
whether nuclear weapons have deterrent value and works for their elimination.
The SPD was at odds with much of American nuclear security
policy during the 1980s. "The SPD expressed its opposition to . . . SDI and the
accompanying Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty reinterpretation; nuclear testing; . . .
and the revival of limited nuclear war scenarios." 215 The "Discriminate
Deterrence" report of January 1988 highlighted a number of disparities:
The SPD took issue with much of the report, including its support of the use
of an "extreme threat" in regional conflicts; limited nuclear warfare capacity;
and its sceptical attitude towards arms control and a chemical weapons ban.
"The European reaction to this report", according to the SPD, "could cause
exactly what it is trying to hinder: namely self-assertion, de-integration,
bilateral structures, and sweeping nuclear arms control."216
Recent positive trends have improved the relationship between U.S.
policy-makers and the SPD, although differences still remain. The most
fundamental of these disagreements is the level of credibility assigned to the
deterrent value of nuclear weapons. The future of these weapons in the Federal
Republic will hinge on the outcome of deliberations between the CDU/CSU-FDP
214National Security Research, 44.
215Matthew A. Weiller, "SPD Security Policy," Survival, Vol. 30
(November/December 1988), 524.
216
"Discriminate Deterrence," Arbeitskreis I der SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 19
January 1988; quoted in Matthew A. Weiller, 524-525.
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government, the SPD, and the United States as they deal with an evolving and
unpredictable international security environment.
D. FUTURE PROSPECTS
Any American observer of German defense can well recall the positive role
that the United States played in the years 1949-1955 in the armament of the
Federal Republic of Germany.217 The United States was the first NATO ally to
put aside apprehensions regarding the German military and played a key role in
introducing the Germans to the processes of military cooperation enshrined in
NATO after 1949, as well as in training the Bundeswehr after 1955. In the
intervening decades, there has ensued an important doctrinal link between the
armies and air forces of the two countries. Despite the reductions in the size of
the U.S. military presence in Europe, opportunities for deepened cooperation exist
todav as well.
J
The Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, General Naumann, is concerned that
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Germany could lead to diminished U.S.
interest in Germany.218 He and his staff worry that the withdrawal could
weaken the bonds built through the positive personal experiences of those




The future of the American security commitment to the Federal Republic
will evolve through a combination of governmental policy and public opinion.
German public opinion indicates ambivalence with respect to both nuclear
weapons and future U.S. troop deployments. Support for the continued presence
of foreign troops on German territory, an anomaly for sovereign nations, has
dropped to 43%, when the NATO-wary eastern Germans are included.219 A
majority of 70% support the removal of all American nuclear weapons from
Germany.220 These two factors have made German politicians wary of debating
the American commitment.
In recent discussions of the U.S. presidential election, several German
perspectives on the American commitment were highlighted. Jochen Thies of the
German Society for Foreign Policy argued that Germans are more comfortable
with George Bush due to his dominant role in German unification. Thies credited
the Bush team with "a particular understanding for the Europeans, for the
Germans."221
219Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and
International Reticence," statement before the House Sub-Committee on Europe
and the Middle East, 1992, 5.
^Asmus, "Germany in Transition," 5.
^Ruth Walker, "Germans Are at Ease With Clinton or Bush," The Christian
Science Monitor, 15 October 1992, 5.
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Some Germans are concerned about American isolationist tendencies,
especially after the conclusion of a prolonged conflict such as the Cold War.
Thies noted a general German concern "that a Clinton administration would not
be that patient with the Europeans—would expect a strong security contribution,
and would proceed faster with the pullout of troops."222 Ulrich Irmer, the Free
Democratic foreign policy spokesman, expressed concern about "tendencies
towards isolationism in America," expressing hope that the future American
military presence will be "more than symbolic."223
Another official from Bonn saw a convergence in the positions of the two
leading candidates and was less concerned about future isolationist tendencies.
"We know that they [the Americans] will be present in Europe, will stay in the
alliance; we can thrash out trade differences, we don't have any fear of a surge
in American isolationism." 224
Karsten Voigt of the SPD sensed a degree of apathy by Germans towards
the American election and the future U.S. commitment.
It's not so much because of lack of interest as because they don't have so






Even if Germans are prepared to urge continued support for the American
commitment, there is concern that the United States could leave the Germans
hanging, as happened in cases such as the 1977-1978 "neutron bomb" affair.
Nevertheless, German government officials continue to emphasize the importance
of the American commitment.
According to former Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg,
The Atlantic Alliance remains the most important institution of collective
security organization and structuring; for, in the future as in the past, only
the close link with North America will be able to counterbalance the
strategic capabilities that will continue to be available to the Soviet Union
even after the withdrawal of its troops from Central Europe. For this
purpose, a continued substantial presence of American conventional and
nuclear forces in Europe will be required.2
'
26
Stoltenberg reaffirmed this American presence requirement a year later in
Munich.227
Chancellor Kohl declared that "the Atlantic Alliance remains the foundation
for peace and freedom in Europe." 228 According to General Naumann, "Only
through an alliance with the U.S. can Europe maintain its balance vis-a-vis the
^Gerhard Stoltenberg, "Managing the Change: European Security Policy and
Transatlantic Relationship in a Time of Change in Europe," Eurogroup Seminar
in Bonn, 10-11 April 1991.
227
Stoltenberg, "Security Policy in the Process of Changing World Politics,"
Address to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 8 February 1992.
^Helmut Kohl, "German-American Friendship a 'Decisive Precondition' for
Mastery of Global Tasks," The Week in Germany, 29 May 1992.
123
Soviet Union, which is in turn, a prerequisite for a policy of co-operation on the
basis of equality." 229 It is evident that the Federal Republic will continue to call
on the security guarantee of the United States. The exact form of this guarantee
is subject to the security circumstances and the political leadership of the day in
the United States and Germany.
The United States has at times shown itself to be ambivalent about its
security commitments to Europe and the Federal Republic. Yet current conditions
realistically leave the Americans no choice. As Christoph Bertram argues,
America, understandably, does not want to see its survival at stake in the
event of a war in Europe, particularly a nuclear war. And Ronald Reagan
[with respect to Reykjavik] has not been the first and will not be the last
American president to try to escape from a NATO doctrine which suggests
otherwise: massive retaliation (Eisenhower), flexible response (Kennedy,
Johnson), limited nuclear options (Nixon, Carter) and the vision of strategic
defence which would render nuclear missiles "impotent and obsolete"—these
are all examples of the recurrent desire of American leaders to avoid
involvements in a theatre conflict of which they cannot control the limits.
It is possible that, as this author believes, these attempts will always be
frustrated. As long as the United States remains committed to the security
of Western Europe with all its military potential, all efforts to introduce
additional fire-breaks on the slope of escalation once the central fire-break,
that of passage of deterrence to nuclear use, has been crossed are likely to
be futile. Only if the United States should ever become convinced that its
security is confined to the integrity of the national territory of the Western
229Asmus, "Germany and America: Partners," 547.
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hemisphere, will it escape from the consequences of extending deterrence
to other regions. As a world power America does not have this choice. 231
One central reason why the United States cannot withdraw from Europe is
that it would put Germany in a position which neither country would like.
According to Josef Joffe, "The ultimate implication of a Western Europe minus the
United States, ... is a nuclear-armed Federal Republic."231 The U.S. withdrawal
would create a European security leadership vacuum that the Federal Republic
would be forced to fill.
Such a development would therefore cause serious domestic political
divisions as well as uneasiness among its neighbors. The possible
emergence of an independent German nuclear force, which could lie at the
end of this road, would be a profoundly unsettling option.232
The debate on the American nuclear guarantee to the Federal Republic is
currently subdued. This is certainly the preferred level of intensity for politicians
in both countries. The Federal Republic and the United States will probably
concentrate on domestic priorities in the near-term, and issues involving nuclear
deterrence will remain in the background. Nevertheless, it would be short-
^Christoph Bertram, "Britain's Nuclear Weapons and West German Security,"
in Karl Kaiser and John Roper, eds., British-German Defence Cooperation: Partners
Within the Alliance (London: Jane's, 1988), 201-202.
231
Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign Policy no. 54 (Spring 1984):
78.
^"The Franco-German Corps and the Future of European Security:
Implications for U.S. Policy," Policy Consensus Reports (Washington, DC: The Johns
Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, June 1992), 2.
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sighted for either country to surrender the bilateral security relationship. The
uncertainty and instability which currently dominate the Federal Republic's
eastern neighbors are a potential threat to the futures of both Germany and
America. Only with Germany and America working as "partners in leadership"
can the future challenges of the post-Cold War security environment be overcome.
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V. GERMAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
A. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union provided the classic threat that solidified the German-
American alliance and commitment. As discussed in the previous chapter, the
dissolution of the Soviet empire has challenged this commitment . The sweeping
changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have also presented new
challenges to the security of the Federal Republic.
This chapter surveys these new threats and the role of nuclear deterrence in
meeting them. It begins with an examination of the nature of the relations
between Germany and its eastern neighbors, concentrating on the former Soviet
Union. The chapter continues with German perspectives on threats and risks
arising from the East such as nuclear weapons, instability, and mass emigration.
It concludes with a discussion of Germany's primary security goals in the East.
B. GERMANY'S NEW ROLE
The power vacuum created by the receding Soviet empire has provided the
Federal Republic with new opportunities and a new role on the continent.
According to Robert Livingston,
The Atlantic-orientated West Germany that we knew from 1949 to 1990 was
an abnormality in German history. Russian power has now receded from
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Eastern Europe. And as has so often happened in the past, German power
is replacing it there.233
With its new role, the Federal Republic also gained new responsibilities.
The Germans now must build a new partnership with the East. According to
Lothar Riihl, "Germany will once again have to look East, as well as West. It
must and will be a reliable partner in security and cooperation for Russia."234
Germany's support for the North Atlantic Cooperation Council discussed in
chapter three is an example of this new bridge-building role. The Federal
Republic moved quickly to promote stability and security with its eastern
neighbors. Germany places great emphasis on the rapid inclusion of the countries
to the east in all possible forums of cooperation. According to former Defense
Minister Rupert Scholz:
The political strength of a reunified Germany, and above all its geopolitical
position in the center of Europe, are not without central meaning for the
future structure of Europe and for a truly viable all-European peace order.
There where the two German fragments were literally the front-states in the
East-West conflict, there a reunified Germany, precisely because of its ties
to the West as well as to the European unification process, will also have to
33Robert Gerald Livingston, "United Germany: Bigger and Better," Foreign
Policy no.87 (Summer 1992): 166.
^Lothar Riihl, "Limits Of Leadership: Germany," in Steven Muller and
Gebhard Schweigler, eds., From Occupation to Cooperation: The United States and
United Germany in a Changing World Order (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1992), 111.
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assume functions of bridge-building to eastern Europe, and thereby also to
the Soviet Union.235
C. NEW THREATS FROM THE EAST
"Germany feels highly vulnerable to instability in the East."236 Government
officials and intellectuals have made arguments highlighting this perceived
vulnerability. In Kohl's words, "What will be needed more than anything else is
to stabilize the political, economic, and social conditions in Central and
Southeastern Europe as well as in the successor states of the Soviet Union."237
German fears of instability in the East can be divided into four main areas:
the future of former Soviet nuclear weapons, the status of Russian troops in
eastern Germany, potential mass emigration from the East, and the possible
emergence of authoritarian governments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union.238 Germans are concerned that the fragmentation of the Soviet empire
has created a conglomeration of independent states with immense challenges
before them. These new states may lack the resources, both economic and
^Rupert Scholz, "Die Sowejetunion setzt vor allem in wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht
auf Deutschland," Die Welt, 18 September 1990; quoted in National Security
Research, 25.
^Livingston, 166.
^Kohl cited in Livingston, 166.
^Robert D. Blackwill, "Patterns of Partnership: The U.S.-German Security
Relationship in the 1990s," in Occupation, Muller and Schweigler, 121.
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liberal asylum laws, and the SPD's recent decision in favor of tightening controls
may indicate a political consensus on the issue.241
Germany will be the first European Community country to bear the
brunt of any mass exodus resulting from a chaotic dissolution of the former
Soviet Union. While conditions remain reasonably stable, the German
government is making efforts to ensure an adequate environment for the ethnic
Volga Germans that remain in the region in order to discourage their movement
west to Germany. The German government is also attempting to negotiate
agreements with East European governments to return refugees in an effort to
stem anti-foreigner violence in Germany. The Germans are already overwhelmed
with refugee problems in their country and chaos in the East could be disastrous.
According to German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, immigration is threatening
the stability of German democracy.242
2. Friendly Buffer Zone
The Federal Republic has gained strategic depth as a result of the
historic change in Europe. In addition to gaining the territory of eastern
Germany, the Federal Republic has a buffer between itself and the former Soviet
241Francine S. Kiefer, "Germans Agree To Tighten Asylum Process," The
Christian Science Monitor, 18 November 1992, 1.
242 >
'Refugees: Keep Out," The Economist (19 September 1992): 64.
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Preventing negative trends in this vast region is of vital interest to the
Germans. The establishment of authoritarian regimes with nationalistic platforms
would certainly disrupt economic relations and jeopardize German security. The
Federal Republic has concentrated economic aid and political and social support
on the emerging democracies to the East in order to assist the development of
regime legitimacy and underpin the transfer to democracy. If these efforts fail,
the Federal Republic may be swamped with refugees as outlined in the scenario
above.
3. Nuclear Weapons
Despite the numerous agreements that have been concluded since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the future of the nuclear weapons in this region
is still in question. The emergence of additional nuclear weapons states on
Germany's eastern border is a major security concern of the Federal Republic.
The Germans are also concerned about the safety of these weapons and potential
nuclear strategies that may emerge in the new strategic situation. The former
Soviet Union will not be able to isolate its nuclear command and control structure
from the society within which it is embedded.244 German efforts to control
problems of instability outlined in the previous two sections are of great
244Kurt M. Campbell, Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, and Charles A.
Zraket, "Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating
Soviet Union," CSIA Studies in International Security No. 1, 1 November 1991, i.
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might become a target for grabbing in some civil conflict or become an issue
or, worse, an instrument, in interstate conflict.247
Nuclear proliferation to Ukraine and /or Belarus could shake the
structure of security in Central Europe. These two countries could set off a chain
of proliferation in Eastern Europe that could force the Federal Republic to rethink
its nuclear options. Although currently there is much domestic opposition to any
move in the nuclear direction, the nuclearization of additional states on
Germany's eastern borders could change the German perspective in this
realm.248
Some German experts might see limited nuclear proliferation as being
in the interest of the Federal Republic. Proliferation to states such as Ukraine or
Belarus could produce a "nuclear-equipped buffer zone" that would stand
between Moscow and Germany.249
As German experts have sifted through the mounds of documents
which they seized in eastern Germany, they have begun to obtain a feel for the
operational plans of countries heavily influenced by the former Soviet Union.
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sovereign German territory, but the likelihood for ethnic, and possibly
domestic political turmoil within this grouping of forces cannot be dismissed
as being impossible. Thus, should these forces become internally unstable,
for whatever reason, Bonn, and perhaps eventually NATO, could be faced
with a politically explosive situation in trying to reestablish stability.252
These forces are scheduled to be removed by the end of 1994. Until
that point German relations with Russia will focus on the smooth and rapid
withdrawal of these troops and equipment. Some observers judge that the
Federal Republic might find it difficult to obtain outside support in the event of
a conflict with Russia about this troop withdrawal as Germany's allies might fear
the potential for escalation. Dr. Young highlights this problem:
If Bonn concludes that it alone will have to deal with instability associated
with the remaining Soviet military presence it its country, it will have no
choice but to consider the option of accelerating the process of nationalizing
its national defense, with all the political repercussions that would produce.
And that surely must be an eventuality no one in Europe, or North America,
wishes to come to pass.253
D. MEETING THE THREAT
Germany's policy for dealing with perceived threats from the East has taken
varied forms. The Federal Republic has been the leader among Western countries
in providing economic aid to its eastern neighbors, hoping to alleviate instability.
252Thomas-Durell Young, "Securing Eastern Germany and the Disposition of
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The Germans are presently experiencing within their own country, many of
the problems of their eastern neighbors. Unification has highlighted the large task
that remains before the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the former
USSR. According to Christoph Bertram,
The immense task of transforming a centralized planning economy into a
market one while maintaining political stability; the human hardship facing
those who have to learn to live in a competitive society; the mortgage of
degradation piled up by the old regimes, which will have to be paid off for
a long time to come; the task of introducing the rule of law into what was
a discretionary political system—all of these problems have to be solved
throughout Eastern Europe.256
Germany's current tribulations over absorbing its new eastern Lander (the former
East Germany) stimulate concerns about the prospects of countries unable to draw
on such large capital reserves.
The Federal Republic has been quite ambitious in its moves to keep the
faltering Russian economy afloat. The Germans "are willing to provide
substantial finance to minimize the damage that might follow from a more rapid
economic decline."257 As the region becomes more dependent on financial
backing from the Federal Republic, Germany's influence in Central and Eastern
Europe will increase.
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Russian ventures in the East, the Russians are wary of a German move to fill the
Soviet vacuum left in Eastern Europe. In the Russian perspective, the "American
forces/ nuclear weapons offer an important restraint against future German
ambitions in the East."260
Russia will remain the strongest military power on the Eurasian land mass
for the foreseeable future. The Federal Republic must take this reality into
account as it formulates future security plans. "German foreign policy is dictated
by avoidance of steps that will provoke or irritate the [former] Soviet Union." 261
What Germany must avoid is pursuing an Eastern policy without a defense
policy.262
260
Jeffrey A. Larsen and Patrick Garrity, "The Future of Nuclear Weapons in
Europe," Report No. 12, (Los Alamos, NM: Center for National Security Studies,
December 1991), 4.
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The threat to Europe's southern periphery was recently highlighted by the
Gulf War. The aggression by Iraq exemplified most of the potential challenges
to Europe's security from the periphery. Iraq threatened European access to
natural resources and markets, stimulated international terrorism, and exhibited
the proliferation of new weapons technologies.264
This discussion concentrates on the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their potential delivery vehicles. In the following section each
country is surveyed with respect to its capabilities for nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons. The section concludes with an examination of ballistic missile
capabilities on Europe's periphery.
1. Nuclear Weapons
According to Leornard Spector's 1990 analysis, "For the next five to ten
years, Israel is likely to remain the only Middle Eastern nation to possess nuclear
weapons or the ability to manufacture them."265 Israel has not gone public with
its reported nuclear weapons program. Much of what is known of its program
264Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War (London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1991), 58-59.
265Leornard S. Spector, with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread
of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 143.
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unlikely to remain in Iraq indefinitely. Continued aspirations to nuclear
weapons capabilities will remain a threat from Iraq for the foreseeable future.
Iran is actively responding to these developments from its neighbor to
the west. "According to White House officials quoted earlier this month
[December 1991], the United States government is convinced that Iran has
launched a secret effort to build the bomb."270 Recent reports also indicate a
secret agreement between China and Algeria supplying a nuclear reactor large
enough to make weapons-grade plutonium. 271 The prospect of anti-Western,
fundamentalist Islamic republics in possession of nuclear weapons is widely seen
as a possible future security problem for Europe.272
Syria's nuclear program has raised concerns over its "suspicious
intentions."273 Syria is not known to have significant nuclear facilities, although
in February 1992 the Syrians indicated their intention to import a small research
270Leornard S. Spector, "Is Iran Building a Bomb?" The Christian Science Monitor,
31 December 1991, 18.
271James L. Tyson, "Chinese Nuclear Sales Flout Western Embargoes," The
Christian Science Monitor, 10 March 1992, 3.
272Algeria is in the midst of a political struggle with its fundamentalist Muslim
parties. The possibility of an Iranian-style Islamic republic is quite genuine.
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We do not need an atomic bomb, we have the dual chemical. Whoever
threatens us with the atomic bomb, we will annihilate him with the dual
chemical.277
Chemical weapons proliferation is difficult to assess due to the multiple
uses of many of the associated chemicals. Without stringent procedures like those
used by the United Nations in Iraq, stemming further proliferation will be
problematic. Most of the countries have the capability for autonomous
production, and in some cases this capability was provided by the Germans.278
According to Kathleen Bailey, "Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Libya are among
those that have taken the position that an Arab chemical weapons capability is
necessary to counter Israel's nuclear capability."279 The Arabs refuse to make
arrangements which would freeze what they consider to be Israeli nuclear
hegemony in the region.
3. Biological Weapons
Biological and toxin weapons are less widespread due to complications
involved with control, storage and stability. Nevertheless, Iraq "is said to be
277Alan Cowell, "Iraq Chief, Boasting of Poison Gas, Warns of Disaster If
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via outright purchases of equipment, component technologies, and
production facilities.282
Ballistic missiles were used extensively in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran's
motives for obtaining ballistic missiles were to respond to Iraqi missile attacks
and to compensate for Iraqi air superiority.283
So long as Iraq remains its principal adversary, Iran will likely continue to
emphasize short-range (300 km and less) missile systems capable of placing
Iraq's major cities at risk. Attempts to improve missile accuracy, in order
to enhance capabilities for tactical missions, will take precedence over
desires to increase range. If, on the other hand, the threats emanating from
other Arab countries, or Israel, increase in the near future, Iran may seek
longer-range systems.284
Israel has the capability to indigenously produce medium-range
ballistic missiles with a range of at least 900 miles.285 "Many believe that Israel's
Jericho missiles are, or readily could be, fitted with nuclear warheads."286 Such
capabilities would enable the Israelis to threaten any potential Arab aggressor.
After suffering humiliating defeats at the hands of the Israelis, the
Syrians have pursued weapons modernization programs, including the acquisition
282Center for International Security and Arms Control Stanford University,
Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control (Stanford, CA: Center for
International Security and Arms Control, 1991), 65.
283Center for International Security, 66.
284
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possess missiles of any significant range and lacks the infrastructure to produce
them indigenously.
Qadhafi may want missiles because he lacks enough pilots or the
infrastructure to support a strong air force, and because of his desire to
project power against out-of-area adversaries, such as the countries of
southern Europe.292
C. ANALYZING THE THREAT
The mere possession or, in some cases, potential for possession of weapons
of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles is not the sole factor that implies
a potential threat to Europe's southern periphery. A concentration on the element
of capability without an analysis of the political aims these weapons might serve
would produce an empty argument.293
There is little question that the Middle East and North Africa are volatile
regions. "A population explosion, economic underdevelopment, radical Islamic
leaders, and a proliferation of ballistic missiles with chemical and possibly nuclear
warheads" are factors warranting European attention.294 The question remains,
"Why would African and Middle Eastern countries want to fire, or threaten to
292Center for International Security, 69.
293
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could face a similar threat from Libya, as France could face from Algeria; any of
these scenarios could test the cohesiveness of the Atlantic alliance.
During the Gulf War Germany had great difficulty coming to terms with its
obligations to its Turkish ally, highlighting potential conflicts in future scenarios.
Internal turmoil erupted in Germany as the opposition reacted to government
decisions to send Luftwaffe aircraft to Turkey. Public opinion was divided on the
obligation and the government was ineffectual and slow in communicating
German alliance cohesion. The experience damaged German credibility in NATO
and stimulated internal debate concerning a re-direction of German threat
perceptions. According to Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, "Security issues in the
Mediterranean and Middle East, as the Iraqi crisis demonstrated beyond doubt,
have become an immediate concern for the security and defence policy of
European countries, including Germany."299
Currently the direct threat to Europe from the southern periphery is remote
and hypothetical.
If countries in North Africa and the Middle East acquire nuclear weapons
to tip their ballistic missiles or to arm their strike aircraft, this capability can
also be thought of as threatening. But again, it is unclear why these
countries would want to use such weapons against Western Europe.300
299i
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Europe and the Gulf, eds. Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper (Paris: The Institute for
Security Studies Western European Union, 1992), 69.
300Honig, 52.
153
could face a similar threat from Libya, as France could face from Algeria; any of
these scenarios could test the cohesiveness of the Atlantic alliance.
During the Gulf War Germany had great difficulty coming to terms with its
obligations to its Turkish ally, highlighting potential conflicts in future scenarios.
Internal turmoil erupted in Germany as the opposition reacted to government
decisions to send Luftwaffe aircraft to Turkey. Public opinion was divided on the
obligation and the government was ineffectual and slow in communicating
German alliance cohesion. The experience damaged German credibility in NATO
and stimulated internal debate concerning a re-direction of German threat
perceptions. According to Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, "Security issues in the
Mediterranean and Middle East, as the Iraqi crisis demonstrated beyond doubt,
have become an immediate concern for the security and defence policy of
European countries, including Germany."299
Currently the direct threat to Europe from the southern periphery is remote
and hypothetical.
If countries in North Africa and the Middle East acquire nuclear weapons
to tip their ballistic missiles or to arm their strike aircraft, this capability can
also be thought of as threatening. But again, it is unclear why these
countries would want to use such weapons against Western Europe.300
299Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, "Germany and the Iraq Conflict," in Western
Europe and the Gulf, eds. Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper (Paris: The Institute for
Security Studies Western European Union, 1992), 69.
300Honig, 52.
153
Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf could become as important a
preoccupation for German security policy as the Russian problem.303
Lothar Riihl used a similar line of reasoning to justify a new rationale
for NATO.
For the security of Europe, the defense to the south will, in the future, be of
greater significance than the defense to the east from the Central Front. A
commensurate shift of means (by the Alliance) is unavoidable. In the future,
Europe's security will be enhanced not so much by NATO's eastward
expansion to the Oder-Neisse, but rather by the strengthening of its southern
flank.304
Other Germans are less convinced of an imminent shift in priorities for
the Federal Republic or NATO. These critics do not expect the future threats
from the South to be met with military means. General Klaus Naumann is one
of these skeptics.
I do not believe that an expansion of the region of the Alliance is called for
[by the Middle East events] . . . because a military threat to a collective
defense alliance in the classical sense is unlikely to emerge in those areas.
There is the potential of threats aimed at vulnerable industrial societies. But
at least in the foreseeable future, ... I can conceive of no case that could be
resolved by NATO with the classical means of the Alliance.305
303Stephen F. Szabo, "The New Germany and European Security," Beyond the
Cold War: Current Issues in European Security No.l (Washington, DC: The Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990), 12.
304Lothar Riihl, "Golfkrise liegt Schwachen der NATO bloss" Die Welt, 24 August
1990; cited in National Security Research, "German Perspectives on NATO and
European Security" (Fairfax, VA: National Security Research, August 1991), 29.
305
"Generalmajor Naumann," SISTRA, 4 September 1990; cited in National
Security Research, 30.
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Stoltenberg continues this line of reasoning, this time being more
specific:
In the area of tension embracing the Islamic countries from Pakistan to
Algeria, this marks in particular a zone for potential "faults" that extends to
the immediate vicinity of Europe. Considering the very high dependence
on free access to raw materials and on the freedom of the seas and of the air
with a view to the existence of the West European and also North American
countries, any events happening in this region and others can greatly affect
the economic and social bases of the West.308
German military planners attempting to justify a more active role for
the Bundeswehr allude to threats to Europe's southern periphery. "Acute dangers
to Europe's security and stability can also be observed in regions outside Europe,
such as northern Africa or the Middle East."309 In molding Germany's security
interests these strategists propose two goals:
—the maintenance of free world trade and access to strategic raw materials
—the creation, preservation, and safeguarding of worldwide political,
economic, military and ecological stability.310
The German government emphasizes the dangers of proliferation as an
emerging threat. Chancellor Helmut Kohl recently "stressed the seriousness of
security issues today, particularly the proliferation of nuclear, biological and
308Gerhard Stoltenberg, "Security Policy in the Process of Changing World
Politics," Address to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 8 February 1992,
4-5.
309
"Risks for the Country and the People," Der Spiegel (20 January 1992): 33-35;
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The Non-Proliferation treaty must be extended indefinitely in 1995. If we
fail to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons mankind will become exposed
to a nuclear threat no less frightening than that of the Cold war. We cannot
put the nuclear genie back in the bottle, but we must keep it under strict
control.313
Karl Kaiser argues that the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction can threaten Western interests directly and indirectly. The indirect
threat stems from the regional instability which would evolve from the
proliferation of these weapons in circumstances lacking the traditional controls
which stabilized the East-West conflict. The direct threat stems from the
combination of these weapons with the spread of missile technology. Kaiser also
alludes to the possibility of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction and
threatening the Federal Republic.314
2. Threat?
Through numerous public statements the German government has
delineated its perception of the security threat from the South. The Germans
highlight underdeveloped economies, overpopulated countries, and unstable
political regimes, challenges to free trade, disputed access to vital natural
resources, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless,
313Klaus Kinkel, Speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, New
York, 23 September 1992, Statements and Speeches Vol. 25, No. 13 (New York:
German Information Center, 1992), 3.
314Karl Kaiser, "Security Relationships: Germany," Occupation, Muller and
Schweigler, pp. 161-162.
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manufacturers of substantial and profitable business meeting the needs of
Arab populations.316
The level of threat that Germans face from the South will continue to
be a source of debate. Although Germany is not directly threatened by weapons
from Europe's southern periphery, that threat will increase with the current trend
of proliferation. The Middle East and northern Africa are likely to remain an area
of volatility. Germany's policy prescription to deal with this eventuality is the
subject of the next section.
3. Meeting The Threat
The Germans have several policy options to meet the emerging security
challenges from the South. The Federal Republic is certain to attempt to develop
closer trading ties and measures to accelerate economic growth in the area. These
efforts already receive great emphasis in the East and as problems arise in the
South, non-military options are the premiere choice of policy makers.
Nevertheless, the Federal Republic will have to prepare for a
contingency in which economic measures and closer political ties have failed to
limit tension. Some German experts may look to the Gulf War as an example of
the potential for conventional deterrence. Third World countries which show
progress towards development of weapons of mass destruction may be deterred
316Walter Russell Mead, "The Once and Future Reich" World Policy Journal
Volume VII, No.4 (Fall 1990): 638.
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northern Africa. "He said that the wave of Islamic fundamentalism has now
reached Algeria, and the security policy consequences for southern Europe must
be taken very seriously."319
Germans continue to call for this protection within the umbrella of
NATO. Beatrice Heuser, a German security analyst, summarizes NATO's
rationale for nuclear weapons:
Nuclear weapons, in short, will continue to be needed by NATO to
counterbalance the nuclear capabilities of any unpredictable, undemocratic,
or hostile power. Quite apart from the military threat posed by nuclear
arms in the hands of belligerent powers, the mere unilateral possession of
such weapons creates the precondition for blackmail.320
Applying traditional deterrence theory to threats from the southern
periphery is problematic. One difficulty is whether the Federal Republic can
count on the United States to threaten to employ nuclear weapons against a threat
from the South, in the same way it promised to exert such threats against the
Soviet Union. Leonard S. Spector ties the regional threat problem together with
nuclear proliferation.
The 1991 Gulf War and the more recent disintegration of the Soviet Union
strongly suggest that the most serious challenges to U.S. security in the
coming decade are likely to be posed by hostile regional powers. Such
powers will be able to threaten American interests abroad, as well as
American forces deployed overseas, and, in some cases, even the continental
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For example, would deterrence work against an irrational actor? While it
is fair to point out that the world has not seen any Hitlers in power since
the end of the Thousand-Year Reich—that is, an irrational leader with the
will and the means to project his madness well beyond his own borders-
such departures from the norm occur with significant frequency. A world
with many centers of decision making and an increasing number of nuclear
powers will also see a greater likelihood of one supreme decision maker
turning mad. Fundamentalist religions, like Hitler's racist creed, could be
the source of such destructive irrationality. . . . Are the subtleties of the
game of nuclear deterrence as they have developed over the past decades
comprehensible to a new nuclear power? Can the taboo that has existed on
the use of nuclear weapons since 1945 remain unbroken indefinitely?
Decisions will have to be made with many factors remaining unknown, and
with potential consequences of error being enormous.323
E. CONCLUSION
Europe's security environment has experienced an enormous transition with
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Germany is re-defining its own security
identity within the larger European realm. Attention is now divided between the
instability in the East and the emerging threat from the South.
A volatile region without the resources to support its growing population,
Europe's southern periphery will be a security challenge for some time. The
growth of Islamic fundamentalist ideas which are vehemently anti-Western only
fuels unrest. Economic interdependence provides incentives for the maintenance
of free and open trade. The North-South division is increasing every day as
population growth exceeds economic growth in the Third World. Instability in
323Heuser, 222.
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The future of German nuclear policy is uncertain in the changed security
environment of the post-Cold War era. The experience of the last forty years is
likely to deeply affect this policy. The Federal Republic will continue to face
alliance uncertainties, threats from the South and East, and a volatile public which
is wary of nuclear weapons.
The goal of this thesis has been to reach informed judgments concerning
Germany and the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe. Prior to presenting any
conclusions it is important to first recall the overall context of German security
policy. The Federal Republic is currently absorbed in the national unification
process. Preoccupations regarding anti-foreigner violence, exchange rate
controversy and European unity have only enhanced Germany's turn inward.
The future of nuclear deterrence in Europe is not the "front burner" issue in the
Federal Republic.
Indeed, international security issues no longer receive much attention in
Germany. The Federal Republic no longer considers itself a front-line state.
Military power has lost what little importance it had with many Germans. The
Deutschemark is considered Germany's premiere diplomatic lever in an
international system less constrained by superpower conflict. The peaceful
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victory achieved in the cold war has only strengthened German convictions
advocating a reliance on economic and diplomatic means.325
This context helps shape some of the conclusions of this study. The Federal
Republic will probably avoid making any decisions on the future of nuclear
deterrence for several years. The Germans will maintain the status quo: that is,
permitting the continued stationing of a small number of U.S. gravity-bomb
nuclear weapons assigned to dual-capable aircraft. The political debate that
would surround modernization is currently considered unacceptable, partly
because most German political leaders are unwilling at this time to completely
denuclearize Germany.
As for the series of issues addressed in this thesis, the main findings may
be summarized as follows. The prospects for British-French nuclear cooperation
leading to the development of a joint "European" deterrent appear slim. Due to
fiscal constraints, the two countries may be forced to cooperate to reduce costs.
Nevertheless, the political ties required to jointly control nuclear weapons are
probably years away. The Federal Republic is unwilling to accept a guarantee
from either France or Britain as a substitute for U.S. nuclear protection. Neither
country is trusted at the required level, nor is either considered capable of
providing adequate protection. In the extended long term, it appears that closer
325Klaus Naumann, "Germany's Military Future," in Meet United Germany, ed.
Susan Stern (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1991), 211.
168
European unity is essential. In this light, political ties which place an equal
premium on each region of Europe will certainly support a "European" deterrent.
The Germans will probably continue to rely on the American guarantee as
long as it is available and credible. Pressure will be great from isolationist
strands within the United States to bring military forces home. Nevertheless, the
United States will probably continue to provide the guarantee, partly in order to
avoid a situation where Germany must pursue its own force. In the Federal
Republic the presence of U.S. forces is no longer an important political issue.
Until all Russian forces withdraw from eastern Germany, pressure for removing
U.S. forces and nuclear weapons will probably be more pronounced in the United
States than in Germany. The Federal Republic has dealt with these pressures
from the onset of the U.S. guarantee, and is unlikely to overreact.
After 1994, when the Russians are expected to have completely withdrawn
from eastern Germany and a new election may bring a possible change in
government, German political attitudes may change. The momentum might be
sufficient to stimulate advocates of a nuclear weapons-free Federal Republic.
Several German experts are nonetheless skeptical that a new government would
be willing to sacrifice the insurance provided by the American nuclear guarantee.
Germany is most directly threatened by the potential instability of its eastern
neighbors, most specifically the Russians. The Federal Republic will avoid any
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overtures at this time which might delay the timely withdrawal of Russian forces
from eastern Germany. Germany's perception of the threat from the East will be
the most critical determining factor in its security decisions in the future. A
continued U.S. nuclear guarantee will be desired to counter the potential of the
thousands of nuclear weapons which will remain in the former Soviet Union for
the remainder of the decade and beyond.
How is the Federal Republic of Germany going to deal with the problems
which are developing on Europe's southern periphery? Counting on
nonproliferation measures to succeed in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons
is wishful thinking. Many of the more direct threats to be faced by the Federal
Republic can not be met with military means. Conventional deterrence has not
proven itself, and missile defenses are considered too costly by most Germans at
this time. Germans foresee difficulties in the region but rarely see a role for
nuclear deterrence. Several German experts propose the retention of a U.S.
nuclear guarantee in order to meet the potential of nuclear blackmail.
Nonetheless, because of their distance from the Mediterranean, the Germans are
less concerned about threats from the south than are countries such as France and
Italy.
The Germans are unlikely to pursue an autonomous national nuclear
deterrent. There is currently no domestic constituency in favor of such a move,
170
and many would actively combat a German turn in a nuclear direction. Only if
Germany's eastern neighbors threatened its security, proliferation spread
extensively, and the Federal Republic was insecure in its American or "European"
guarantee, would it be probable that Germany would rethink its nuclear option.
Casual observers of European security affairs that argue that German attainment
of a national nuclear deterrent is inevitable underestimate the strong antimilitary
and antinuclear sentiment in today's German political culture.
The Federal Republic of Germany is the linchpin in the future of nuclear
deterrence in Europe. Nuclear deterrence has been reduced in its level of
importance, owing to the changes in international political circumstances. The
Germans are preoccupied with domestic challenges in the near term and are
unlikely to bring the issue to the forefront in the near future. In the longer term
the Federal Republic will have to make some choices. It is in the interests of the
United States that these German decisions are simplified through a credible U.S.
nuclear guarantee. As Elizabeth Pond has pointed out, "Today's ultimate threat
of nuclear annihilation surely counsels preventive engagement to help maintain
a benign political system in Europe, rather than another belated intervention after
events have spun out of control."326
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Elizabeth Pond, "Germany in the New Europe," Foreign Affairs Vol. 71, No.
2 (Spring 1992): 117.
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